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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court of the United States rarely grants certiorari in
a veterans benefits case. Congress gave the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit exclusive jurisdiction over veterans
1
appeals in 1988 but, until 2009, the Supreme Court had reviewed
2
only two Federal Circuit veterans decisions. In the 2010 Term,
however, the Court decided its second veterans case in less than two
3
years.
Although patent lawyers are familiar with a trend of
4
increasing Supreme Court interest in the Federal Circuit’s work,
little attention has been paid to the similar, albeit incipient, trend
that may be emerging in the field of veterans law.
In this Article, I explore whether the recent increase in Supreme
Court veterans cases indicates a new, genuine interest in veterans law
or is simply an aberration. Although I conclude that it is too early to
tell whether a clear trend is developing, the factors that have
potentially contributed to the Court granting certiorari in two cases
in three Terms have the potential to fuel a larger veterans docket for
1. Veterans’ Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687, § 301, 102 Stat. 4105,
4120–21 (1988).
2. Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401 (2004); Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115
(1994); see Michael P. Allen, The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims at
Twenty: A Proposal for a Legislative Commission to Consider Its Future, 58 CATH. U. L. REV.
361, 372 n.59 (2009).
3. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197 (2011); Shinseki v. Sanders, 129 S. Ct.
1696 (2009).
4. See, e.g., Gregory A. Castanias, Lawrence D. Rosenberg, Michael S. Fried &
Todd R. Geremia, Survey of the Federal Circuit’s Patent Law Decisions in 2006: A New
Chapter in the Ongoing Dialogue with the Supreme Court, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 793, 796
(2007); see also infra note 72 (citing additional commentary).
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the Supreme Court in the future. Most notably, veterans in recent
years have increasingly been represented by attorneys with substantial
experience in both the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit,
thanks to newly created pro bono programs for veterans who have
5
meritorious claims but no legal counsel.
In addition to exploring the Supreme Court’s encounters with
veterans law, this Article, as is customary in this issue of the American
University Law Review, summarizes significant developments in
veterans benefits law in 2010, focusing mainly on the decisions of the
6
Federal Circuit. I also briefly consider important veterans legislation
passed by Congress and administrative regulations issued by the
7
United States Department of Veterans Affairs (VA).
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides background on the
veterans claims process and the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction over
veterans cases. Part II explores the emerging dialogue between the
Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit on issues of veterans law and
concludes that we might be entering a new phase of increased
Supreme Court supervision of Federal Circuit veterans decisions. In
Part III, I summarize and analyze the important veterans cases
decided by the Federal Circuit in 2010. Part IV reviews legislative and
administrative developments in the field of veterans law. I conclude
by considering what the future may hold for veterans before the
Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit, Congress, and the VA.
I.

THE VETERANS CLAIMS PROCESS AND
FEDERAL CIRCUIT JURISDICTION

As of September 30, 2010, 3.2 million veterans received disability
8
compensation from the VA. To obtain disability benefits, an eligible
9
veteran must prove three basic elements: (1) a present disability, (2)
5. See infra Part II.C.
6. See infra Part III.
7. See infra Part IV.
8. Nat’l Ctr. for Veterans Analysis & Stat., Department of Veterans Affairs Statistics at
a Glance, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS (Dec. 2010), available at
http://www.va.gov/vetdata/docs/Quickfacts/Homepage-quickfacts.pdf.
Veterans
are eligible for a wide range of benefits from the VA, from education benefits to life
insurance benefits to burial and memorial benefits. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF
VETERANS AFFAIRS, FEDERAL BENEFITS FOR VETERANS, DEPENDENTS & SURVIVORS (2010),
available at http://www1.va.gov/opa/publications/benefits_book.asp (summarizing
benefits available from the VA to veterans, dependents, and survivors). Because
Federal Circuit case law mainly focuses on medical disability benefits, I focus on that
area of law in this background discussion.
9. For an overview of which service members are eligible for benefits and which
are not, see Miguel F. Eaton, Sumon Dantiki & Paul R. Gugliuzza, Ten Federal Circuit
Cases from 2009 that Veterans Benefits Attorneys Should Know, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1155,
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incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury while in military
service, and (3) a causal connection between the present disability
10
and the in-service disease or injury. A veteran may submit a formal
11
12
claim for benefits online or by submitting a hard-copy form and
13
supporting evidence to a VA regional office (RO). The RO reviews
14
the claim under the “benefit of the doubt” standard. Under this
standard, the VA must grant a veteran’s claim if the evidence in favor
15
of and against the claim is approximately equal.
As the benefit of the doubt standard suggests, the claims process is
16
not intended to be adversarial. The VA has a statutory duty to make
reasonable efforts to assist a veteran in developing the evidentiary
17
record to support the claim. As part of the duty to assist, the VA
must, among other things, obtain relevant medical records for the
18
19
veteran, provide medical examinations to certain veterans, and
20
notify veterans of the evidence necessary to substantiate their claims.

1157–58 (2010); see also VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL ch.2 (Barton F. Stichman &
Ronald B. Abrams, eds., 2010) (summarizing eligibility criteria for VA benefits).
10. Holton v. Shinseki, 557 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also 38 U.S.C.
§ 1110 (2006) (providing benefits “[f]or disability resulting from personal injury
suffered or disease contracted in line of duty, or for aggravation of a preexisting
injury suffered or disease contracted in line of duty” during a period of war); id.
§ 1131 (providing benefits for the same disabilities as § 1110 for times other than a
period of war).
11. Veterans Online Application (“VONAPP”), U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
http://vabenefits.vba.va.gov/vonapp/main.asp (last visited Feb. 28, 2011).
12. VA Form 21-526, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS (2009), available at
http://www.vba.va.gov/pubs/forms/VBA-21-526-ARE.pdf.
13. There are fifty-nine VA regional offices, located both in the United States and
abroad. Contact Veterans Benefits Administration, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS (Sept.
18, 2008), http://www.vba.va.gov/bln/21/ro/rocontacts.htm. For a simple overview
of the claims and appeals process, see HOW DO I APPEAL?, BD. OF VETERANS APPEALS
(Apr. 2002) available at http://www.bva.va.gov/docs/Pamphlets/010202A.pdf
[hereinafter HOW DO I APPEAL?]. In addition to formal claims for benefits, certain
actions by a veteran or the VA are considered to be informal claims. See infra Part
III.D.2 (addressing the relationship between informal and formal claims for the same
benefits).
14. 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b).
15. See id. (“When there is an approximate balance of positive and negative
evidence regarding any issue material to the determination of a matter, the Secretary
shall give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant.”); see also 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (2010)
(further explaining the VA’s policy that “reasonable doubt” be resolved in favor of
the veteran).
16. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(a) (“Proceedings before VA are ex parte in nature, and
it is the obligation of VA to assist a claimant in developing the facts pertinent to the
claim and to render a decision which grants every benefit that can be supported in
law while protecting the interests of the Government.”).
17. 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(a)(1) (enacted as part of the Veterans Claims Assistance
Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-475, § 2, 114 Stat. 2096, 2097).
18. Id. § 5103A(b).
19. Id. § 5103A(d).
20. Id. § 5103(a)(1).
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The VA regional office makes the initial decision about whether a
veteran is entitled to benefits. If the RO determines that a veteran
has a service-connected disability, it then makes two further
determinations. First, it determines the severity of the disability by
assigning a “rating,” a percentage that accounts for the impairment of
earning capacity of an average veteran suffering from the same
21
disability. The VA will give a 100% disability rating, for example, to
a veteran suffering from a disability that would render the average
22
veteran completely incapable of holding gainful employment. The
rating determines the amount of monthly benefits paid to the
23
veteran.
In addition to awarding benefits based on generalizations about
the effect of particular disabilities on the average veteran, the system
also accounts for the unique circumstances of individual claimants,
particularly those who cannot maintain employment. For example, a
veteran without a 100% disability rating may still be considered totally
disabled if the VA grants “total disability based on individual
24
unemployability,” called “TDIU” in the parlance of veteran’s law.
To obtain a TDIU rating, the veteran must meet two criteria. First,
the veteran must be unable to sustain gainful employment because of
25
a disability connected to military service. Second, the veteran must
have one disability rated at or above 60% or the veteran must have a
26
combined disability rating of 70% or more with one of the
27
disabilities rated at 40% or more.
The second determination made by the VA is the “effective date”
for benefits payments, typically a date in the past. By regulation, the
effective date is usually the later of: (a) the date the VA received the
claim for benefits or (b) the date the veteran became entitled to
28
benefits (i.e., the date the disability arose). Thus, upon receiving an

21. Id. § 1155.
22. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.15 (2010) (explaining the total disability rating).
23. See 38 U.S.C. § 1114 (providing the rates of monthly compensation for each
disability rating). A veteran’s monthly disability payment can range from $0 (for a
disability rated at 0% impairment of earning capacity) to $2673 (for a disability rated
at 100%). Id. § 1114(a)–(j). Veterans who suffer from particularly severe disabilities
are entitled to special compensation beyond the normal disability payment. See id.
§ 1114(k)–(s).
24. VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL, supra note 9, at 329–30.
25. Id. at 329.
26. In the case of a veteran who suffers from multiple disabilities, the VA rates
each disability separately. Amberman v. Shinseki, 570 F.3d 1377, 1380 (Fed. Cir.
2009). The VA then uses a “combined ratings table” to calculate a single disability
rating used to determine the veteran’s monthly payments. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.25.
27. 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(a).
28. Id. § 3.400.
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award, a veteran will, in addition to receiving benefits in the future,
usually receive back payments of benefits to compensate for the time
29
it took the VA to decide the claim.
If the regional office determines that a veteran is not eligible for
benefits, or if the veteran disagrees with the rating or effective date
established by the RO, the veteran may file a notice of disagreement,
30
which initiates an appeal to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board).
Once a veteran files a notice of disagreement, the RO must prepare a
statement of the case, which, in essence, forms the record on
31
appeal. The RO sends the statement of the case to the veteran,
32
along with VA Form 9, the substantive appeal form. To perfect the
appeal to the Board, the veteran must return that form to the RO
within sixty days of the date the RO mailed the statement of the case,
or within one year of the original RO decision denying the claim,
33
whichever is later.
Before further discussing the claims process, it is important to note
that, until the veteran files a notice of disagreement and appeals to
the Board, the veteran is prohibited from retaining paid counsel to
34
pursue a claim.
This limitation has, correctly in my view, been
35
criticized. Although the VA has a statutory duty to assist the veteran
and must resolve all doubts in the veteran’s favor, the claims process

29. VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL, supra note 9, at 591; see, e.g., Carpenter v.
Principi, 15 Vet. App. 64, 68 (2001) (awarding over $206,000 in past-due benefits).
30. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(f). The notice of disagreement must be filed within one
year from the date that the RO notifies the veteran of its decision. Id. § 20.302(a).
As an alternative to filing a notice of disagreement, a veteran may first request that
the file be reviewed by a Decision Review Officer at the RO who, in essence, performs
a second review of the veteran’s file. HOW DO I APPEAL?, supra note 13, at 4.
31. 38 U.S.C. § 7105(d)(1) (2006); see 38 C.F.R. § 19.29 (providing that a
statement of the case must contain (1) a summary of evidence in the case,
(2) a summary of the applicable law, and (3) the reasons for the RO’s ruling).
32. HOW DO I APPEAL?, supra note 13, at 6.
33. See 38 C.F.R. § 20.302(b)(1). See generally 38 U.S.C. § 7105(a) (2006)
(outlining the procedure for appeal to the Board).
34. 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)(1).
35. See, e.g., David R. DiMatteo, Comment, Walters Revisited: Of Fairness, Due
Process, and the Future of Veterans’ Fight for the Right to Hire an Attorney, 80 TUL. L. REV.
975, 976–82 (2006) (collecting criticism of the ban on paid counsel); see also
Benjamin W. Wright, The Potential Repercussions of Denying Disabled Veterans the Freedom
to Hire an Attorney, 19 FED. CIR. B.J. 433, 446–57 (2010) (analyzing the statistical
probability that veterans represented by counsel would succeed more often in their
appeals); Matthew J. Dowd, Note, No Claim Adjudication Without Representation: A
Criticism of 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c), 16 FED. CIR. B.J. 53, 71–78 (2006) (arguing that the
inability to have counsel prior to filing an appeal results in more pro se appeals,
which often fail for procedural reasons); John W. Egan, Note, The Department of
Veterans Affairs and the Constitutional Implications of Judicial Review: Veterans’ Due Process
Right to Hire Counsel, 16 FED. CIR. B.J. 31, 38–52 (2006) (contending that the
prohibition on hiring an attorney violates veterans’ due process rights).
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36

is inherently adversarial. The government has a scarce resource—
benefits funding—that it must allocate among veterans who want it.
The VA’s institutional flaws, which are no different than those
suffered by any bureaucratic government agency, compound the
37
hostility between veterans and the VA. Furthermore, veterans who
seek benefits are frequently persons who could most benefit from
expert lawyer help to navigate the system. Disability claims raise
38
complex medical issues and the veteran’s ability to understand those
issues might be obstructed by the very disability for which the veteran
is applying for benefits.
Of course, veterans may obtain free help in pursuing their claims
39
from veterans service organizations and law students. But data on
the success of veterans appearing before the Board (where veterans
are, for the first time in the process, permitted to retain paid
counsel) suggest that veterans with attorneys fare quite well. In 2009,
the Board allowed 24% of all the claims it decided, remanded 37.3%,

36. See Battling the Backlog: Challenges Facing the VA Claims Adjudication and Appeal
Process: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 109th Cong. 31 (2005)
(statement of Hon. Kenneth B. Kramer, Former C.J., U.S. Court of Appeals for
Veterans Claims) (noting that “[s]ome will oppose [permitting a veteran to retain
paid counsel earlier in the claims process] as upsetting the non-adversarial agency
process, which in my mind is illusory once you have said ‘no’ to a claimant”); Tom
Daschle, Making the Veterans Administration Work for Veterans, 11 J. LEGIS. 1, 11 (1984)
(“[T]he appeals process is already adversarial. Unfortunately for the veteran, the
opposition acts as both defendant and judge.”); Robert L. Rabin, Preclusion of Judicial
Review in the Processing of Claims for Veterans’ Benefits: A Preliminary Analysis, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 905, 919 (1975) (“While the VA appears to be a strongly client-oriented
organization, . . . the VA is confronted with an impressive number of demands that it
regards as unwarranted.”). Congress took a step toward recognizing the de facto
adversarial nature of the claims process when it amended § 5904 in 2006 to permit
representation by paid counsel before the Board. See Allen, supra note 2, at 378–79
(citing Veterans Benefits, Health Care, and Information Technology Act of 2006,
Pub. L. No. 109-461, § 101, 120 Stat. 3403, 3407). Previously, veterans could retain
counsel only after the Board issued a final decision. See 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c) (2000).
37. See Richard E. Levy, Of Two Minds: Charitable and Social Insurance Models in the
Veterans Benefits System, 13 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 303, 303 (2004) (explaining the
problems of the veterans benefits administration process as resulting from the
mixture of the “charity” and the “social insurance” benefits models); James T.
O’Reilly, Burying Caesar: Replacement of the Veterans Appeals Process Is Needed to Provide
Fairness to Claimants, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 223, 227 (2001) (“The VA ‘paperwork system’
. . . has many significant flaws that deny the ex-soldier or ex-sailor accuracy, efficiency
and acceptability: three tenents [sic] noted . . . to be the keystones of good
administrative procedure.”) (emphasis omitted); Melinda F. Podgor, Note, The
Inability of World War II Atomic Veterans to Obtain Disability Benefits: Time Is Running Out
on Our Chance to Fix the System, 13 ELDER L.J. 519, 529–33 (2005) (asserting that the
inefficient VA claims process has resulted in World War II atomic veterans being left
without disability benefits).
38. Rabin, supra note 36, at 915.
39. Steven K. Berenson, Legal Services for Struggling Veterans—Then and Now,
31 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 101, 134–39 (2009).
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40

and denied 36.1%. Veterans with attorneys obtained allowance in
22.7% of the cases, remand in 46.4%, and had the claim denied in
41
28.8%. By comparison, unrepresented veterans fared much worse,
having their claims allowed in only 18.7% of cases, remanded in
42
32.9%, and denied in 46.1%. If veterans were permitted to retain
counsel even earlier in the process—before a claim reaches the
Board—veterans might have more success before the RO and, as an
additional benefit, reduce the workload of the already overworked
Board.
Returning to the appeals process, the Board of Veterans Appeals
consists of a chairman, vice chairman, principal deputy vice
chairman, and sixty veterans law judges who decide nearly 50,000
43
appeals annually. Appeals are decided by individual members of the
44
Board, or by panels of three or more members. As with proceedings
before the RO, an appeal to the Board is not intended to be
adversarial, although, as noted, a veteran may retain paid counsel
45
when appealing to the Board. At the veteran’s request, the Board
conducts an in-person (or videoconference) hearing where the
46
Board receives testimony and argument relevant to the appeal. The
Board then issues a decision in writing that must: state findings of
fact and conclusions of law; explain the bases for those findings and
conclusions; and contain an order allowing, denying, or remanding
47
the claim to the RO or dismissing the appeal.
If the Board denies a claim, the veteran then has four options for
continuing to pursue the claim. First, the veteran may ask the Board

40. BD. OF VETERANS APPEALS, FISCAL YEAR 2009 REPORT OF THE CHAIRMAN 21–22
(2009), available at
http://www.bva.va.gov/docs/Chairmans_Annual_Rpts/BVA2009AR.pdf.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 3; see also 38 U.S.C. § 7101 (2006) (outlining the composition of the
Board).
44. 38 C.F.R. § 19.3(a) (2010). If the Board decides to reconsider its initial
decision, the appeal will be considered by a panel of three (in the case of a matter
originally heard by a single member) or by an enlarged panel (in the case of a matter
originally heard by a panel of members). Id. § 19.11(b); see also id. § 20.1000 (listing
the grounds for reconsideration by the Board).
45. 38 C.F.R. § 20.700(c) (“Hearings conducted by the Board are ex parte in
nature and nonadversarial.”).
46. Id. § 20.700(b), (e). The hearing may take place at either the VA
headquarters in Washington, D.C. or at any other VA office capable of hosting
hearings. Id. § 20.705.
47. 38 U.S.C. § 7104(d); 38 C.F.R. § 19.7(b); see also 38 C.F.R. § 19.9(a)
(providing that the Board must remand a case to the RO “[i]f further evidence,
clarification of the evidence, correction of a procedural defect, or any other action is
essential for a proper appellate decision”).
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to reconsider its decision. Second, the veteran may return to the
RO and seek to reopen the claim. To have a claim reopened, the
veteran must present “new and material” evidence supporting the
49
claim. Third, the veteran may ask either the RO or the Board to
review its prior decision because it contained “clear and unmistakable
50
error.” Unlike a request to reopen, which is based on new evidence,
a claim of clear and unmistakable error “must be based on the record
51
and the law that existed at the time of the prior adjudication.”
Finally, the veteran may file an appeal with the United States Court of
52
Appeals for Veterans Claims (Veterans Court).
The Veterans Court is an Article I court with exclusive jurisdiction
53
to review decisions of the Board. Only a veteran may appeal to the
54
Veterans Court—the VA has no right to appeal. The scope of issues
that the Veterans Court may decide is very broad and similar to the
scope of issues that an Article III circuit court of appeals may
consider when reviewing a decision of a district court or an
administrative agency. For example, the Veterans Court may
(1) decide any relevant questions of law that arise in a benefits
proceeding, (2) compel VA action unlawfully withheld or
unreasonably delayed, (3) hold unlawful or set aside actions or
regulations adopted by the VA, and (4) reverse the VA’s fact-finding
55
if it is clearly erroneous. Also, just like the Article III courts of
56
appeals, the Veterans Court must apply the harmless-error rule,
48. See supra note 44 (discussing the Board’s reconsideration procedure).
49. 38 U.S.C. § 5108; Norton v. Principi, 376 F.3d 1336, 1338–39 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
There is no time limit on a veteran’s request to reopen a claim. WILLIAM F. FOX, JR.,
THE LAW OF VETERANS BENEFITS: JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 24 (2002).
50. 38 U.S.C. § 7111 (revision by the Board); § 5109A (revision by the RO).
51. Willsey v. Peake, 535 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008). But, like a request to
reopen, a veteran may request revision of a Board decision on the grounds of clear
and unmistakable error at any time. See 38 U.S.C. § 7111(d).
52. See 38 U.S.C. § 7266(a).
53. Id. § 7252(a). The Veterans Court consists of at least three and not more
than seven judges who are appointed for fifteen-year terms by the President and
confirmed by the Senate. Id. § 7253(a)–(c). Currently, the court has seven judges.
Judges, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS,
http://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/about/judges/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2011). The court
may decide cases en banc, in panels of three, or, as the court resolves most of its
cases, in a decision by a single judge. 38 U.S.C. § 7254(b); see FOX, supra note 49, at
21–22 (noting that over seventy-five percent of cases are decided by a single judge).
54. 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a).
55. Id. § 7261(a); see also id. § 7261(c) (prohibiting the Veterans Court from
retrying de novo any factual findings made by the VA or the Board); cf. 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(1)–(2) (2006) (provision of the Administrative Procedure Act permitting the
courts of appeals to compel agency action unlawfully withheld or to set aside
unlawful agency action); FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6) (“Findings of fact, whether based on
oral or other evidence, must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous . . . .”).
56. 38 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(2).
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which forbids the Veterans Court from reversing a Board decision if
57
the error did not affect a veteran’s “substantial rights.”
A decision of the Veterans Court may be appealed by the veteran—
58
In contrast to the
or the government—to the Federal Circuit.
Veterans Court’s broad jurisdiction, the scope of Federal Circuit
review is narrow. The Federal Circuit may review the Veterans
Court’s rulings on questions of law (including issues of constitutional,
59
statutory, or regulatory interpretation).
But it may not review
factual determinations, and it may review the application of law to
60
fact only if it implicates a constitutional issue.
A Federal Circuit decision in a veterans case, like any decision by
an Article III court of appeals, is reviewable in the Supreme Court of
61
the United States by writ of certiorari. In the past two years, the
Supreme Court has used its certiorari jurisdiction more frequently to
review veterans cases, a development explored in the next Part.
II. SUPREME COURT REVIEW OF VETERANS BENEFITS DECISIONS
The previous Part outlined the long course that a veteran’s benefits
claim might follow, winding its way through an administrative agency
(the VA), an administrative appeal (before the Board), and judicial
review by an Article I court (the Veterans Court) and Article III
courts (the Federal Circuit and, possibly, the Supreme Court). But
this was not always the process. Until 1988, there was almost no
62
Congress
judicial review of veterans benefits determinations.
negated the usual presumption in favor of judicial review of
63
administrative action with a statute making the VA’s benefits
decisions “final and conclusive” and not subject to review by any court
64
or official. Despite the statutory bar on judicial review of benefits
decisions, the Supreme Court permitted court challenges to the

57. Shinseki v. Sanders, 129 S. Ct. 1696, 1705 (2009) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2111,
which codifies the harmless error rule for the Article III courts of appeals) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
58. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a).
59. Id. § 7292(d)(1).
60. Id. § 7292(d)(2); Bastien v. Shinseki, 599 F.3d 1301, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
61. 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
62. FOX, supra note 49, at 6–7; Lawrence B. Hagel & Michael P. Horan, Five Years
Under the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act: The VA Is Brought Kicking and Screaming Into the
World of Meaningful Due Process, 46 ME. L. REV. 43, 43–44 (1994); History, U.S. CT. OF
APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS, http://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/about/History.cfm (last
visited Feb. 28, 2011).
63. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967).
64. 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1988).
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65

constitutionality of VA actions and veterans benefits laws. Yet the
vast majority of the VA’s work, determining individual claims for
66
benefits, remained almost entirely immune from judicial review.
In 1988, however, Congress passed the Veterans’ Judicial Review
Act (“VJRA” or “the Act”), which created a system of judicial review of
67
veterans benefits claims.
The legislation was spurred by general
perceptions that VA adjudications lacked consistency and were of
68
poor quality.
The Act created the Veterans Court to review
decisions of the Board, and provided that legal issues decided by the
69
Veterans Court could be appealed further to the Federal Circuit.
Because decisions of the Federal Circuit are reviewable on
70
certiorari, the Act made it possible to appeal (on non-constitutional
grounds) a veterans benefits decision all the way to the Supreme
Court. Yet, before 2009, the Supreme Court had decided only two
veterans cases in the first twenty years of this new framework of
71
judicial review. It is surprising, then, that the Court has decided two
additional veterans cases in the past three Terms.
This pattern may seem familiar to those who follow Federal Circuit
patent law. It has been well documented that the Supreme Court,
after largely ignoring patent decisions for the first twenty years of the

65. See Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 307 (1985)
(reviewing the constitutionality of a statute that limited to $10 the fee charged by an
attorney in a veterans benefits proceeding); Cleland v. Nat’l Coll. of Bus., 435 U.S.
213, 213 (1978) (per curiam) (entertaining a constitutional challenge to a statute
restricting the courses for which veterans educational benefits were available under
the GI Bill); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 366–74 (1974) (holding that § 211(a)
did not preclude judicial review of a constitutional challenge to the VA’s denial of
benefits to a conscientious objector); Hernandez v. Veterans’ Admin., 415 U.S. 391,
393 (1974) (same); see also Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 543–44 (1988)
(permitting judicial review of a claim that the VA wrongly denied a veteran an
extension of time within which to use his educational benefits under the GI Bill
because execution of the GI Bill was “not the exclusive domain” of the VA).
66. FOX, supra note 49, at 11.
67. Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105 (1988).
68. See FOX, supra note 49, at 14; Allen, supra note 2, at 376–77; Hagel & Horan,
supra note 62, at 46; James D. Ridgway, The Veterans’ Judicial Review Act Twenty Years
Later: Confronting the New Complexities of the Veterans Benefits System, 66 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 251, 253, 255–56 (2010). For years, major veterans groups had actually
blocked efforts at introducing judicial review. By 1988, however, the insurgent
Vietnam Veterans of America had broken with established veterans groups and
“ma[d]e judicial review politically unstoppable” by publicizing the popularity of
judicial review among veterans. Laurence R. Helfer, The Politics of Judicial Structure:
Creating the United States Court of Veterans Appeals, 25 CONN. L. REV. 155, 161–65 (1992).
69. VJRA § 301, 102 Stat. at 4113. The Act also repealed a $10 statutory limit on
attorneys’ fees, although veterans were still restricted from obtaining paid
representation before the RO and the Board. Id. § 104, 102 Stat. at 4108; see supra
note 36 (discussing the statutory prohibition on paid counsel).
70. 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (2006).
71. See infra Part II.A.
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Federal Circuit’s existence, has become exceptionally active in patent
72
law in the past decade.
The recent uptick in Supreme Court
veterans cases raises the question of whether we are similarly leaving a
laissez faire “first wave” and entering a period of more aggressive
Supreme Court oversight.
A. The First Wave? (1988–2008)
The two veterans cases decided by the Supreme Court in the first
two decades after the enactment of VJRA addressed the same topic:
government monetary liability. While all veterans benefits cases are
essentially claims against the government for money, what
distinguished these cases was that the claims were for compensation
beyond what is provided in the typical benefits case.
The first post-VJRA veterans case decided by the Court, the 1994
73
decision in Brown v. Gardner, involved a veteran who sought
compensation for a lower body injury that, the veteran alleged, was
the unintended result of surgery in a VA hospital for a herniated
74
disc. The question presented was whether, to recover damages for
an injury resulting from VA medical treatment, a veteran must prove
75
that the VA was “at fault,” i.e., that it acted negligently or carelessly.
The relevant statute provided compensation for “an injury or an
aggravation of an injury” that occurred “as the result of” VA medical
76
treatment.
The Court held that the statute did not require the
77
veteran to show fault by the VA. The Court insisted that the word
72. See, e.g., Castanias et al., supra note 4, at 798–816; Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss,
Lecture, What the Federal Circuit Can Learn from the Supreme Court—and Vice Versa,
59 AM. U. L. REV. 787, 792–93 (2010); John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return
of the Supreme Court to the Bar of Patents, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 273, 278 (2002); Timothy
B. Dyk, Foreword, Does the Supreme Court Still Matter?, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 763, 764–65
(2008); Arthur J. Gajarsa & Lawrence P. Cogswell, III, Foreword, The Federal Circuit
and the Supreme Court, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 821, 821–23 (2006); John M. Golden, The
Supreme Court as “Prime Percolator”: A Prescription for Appellate Review of Questions in
Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657, 658–59 (2009); Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy,
Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1625, 1639–40
(2007). An article in the 2007 Federal Circuit issue of this Journal identified “three
waves” of Supreme Court review of Federal Circuit patent cases. Castanias et al.,
supra note 4. In the first wave (1982–94), the Supreme Court took a “hands off”
approach to patent law. Id. at 798. In a second wave (1995–2002), the Court
decided important questions of patent law, but generally affirmed the Federal
Circuit. Id. at 802–03. Finally, in the current third wave (2002–present), the Court
has actively disagreed with the Federal Circuit on questions of patent law, as well as
on questions of jurisdiction and procedure in patent cases. Id. at 808–10.
73. 513 U.S. 115 (1994).
74. Id. at 116.
75. Id. at 116–17.
76. Id. at 116 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 1151 (Supp. 1988)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
77. Id. at 117.
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“injury” did not connote a fault standard and that the “as a result of”
language required only a causal connection between the injury and
78
VA treatment.
Ten years later, the Court decided its second post-VJRA veterans
79
case. In Scarborough v. Principi, the veteran prevailed in the Veterans
Court, so his attorney applied for fees under the Equal Access to
80
Although the attorney timely filed the fee
Justice Act (EAJA).
application, the application did not allege, as required by EAJA, that
81
the government’s litigating position “was not substantially justified.”
By the time the attorney realized the mistake, the deadline for filing
82
the application had passed. The question was whether the attorney
83
could, after the filing deadline, amend the fee application.
84
The Court permitted the post-deadline amendment. It reasoned
that the no-substantial-justification requirement was simply a
pleading requirement, which was subject to the relation-back
85
doctrine. That doctrine permits a litigant to cure a defect in the
form of a pleading after the filing deadline has passed because the
formally imperfect filing leaves no doubt about the substantive issues to
86
be contested.
Gardner and Scarborough were strong candidates for certiorari. Both
cases presented questions about the interpretation of statutes
87
imposing financial liability on the federal government. Moreover,
in Gardner, the Solicitor General urged the Court to grant certiorari,

78. Id. at 117–20. Congress has since amended the relevant statue to require a
showing of fault. See 38 U.S.C. § 1151(a) (2006) (requiring claimant to show that
injury or death resulted from “carelessness, negligence, lack of proper skill, error in
judgment, or similar instance of fault on the part of the [VA]”); see also infra Part
III.E (discussing 2010 Federal Circuit case applying Gardner to acts of omission).
79. 541 U.S. 401 (2004).
80. Id. at 408.
81. Id. at 409 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
82. Id. at 409–10.
83. Id. at 406.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 415–16.
86. Id. at 415–19; see FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(B) (providing that “[a]n
amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when . . .
the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction,
or occurrence set out . . . in the original pleading”).
87. See ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 248 (8th ed. 2002)
(noting that, in cases involving the government, the Court may grant certiorari
“where the issues simply concern the construction of a major federal statute” and
that “[t]he fact that especially large amounts of money are involved in litigation over
the issue of statutory construction may also be a persuasive factor”) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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which greatly increased the odds of Supreme Court review.
89
Although the government opposed review in Scarborough, that case
was particularly suitable for certiorari given that the courts of appeals
had disagreed on whether an EAJA fee application could be
90
amended after the initial filing deadline had run. In short, both
Gardner, which essentially involved a question of federal government
tort liability, and Scarborough, which presented a clear circuit split on a
federal statute of general application, involved issues that the
Supreme Court would likely have decided regardless of whether they
arose in a veterans case or in some other field.
B. A New Wave? (2009–present)
In the past two years, the Supreme Court has, for the first time,
considered issues in veterans cases that do not directly implicate the
federal government’s financial liability. Instead, both cases decided
since 2009 address issues of procedure that, to some extent, apply
only to veterans cases.
91
In its 2009 decision in Shinseki v. Sanders, the Court overturned an
unusual framework that the Federal Circuit had developed to
determine which errors in veterans cases were prejudicial and thus
92
warranted reversal on appeal. At issue in Sanders was the statutory
duty of the VA to assist veterans in developing claims. Upon
receiving an application for benefits, the VA must notify the veteran
of any additional evidence that the VA needs to substantiate the
93
claim. The statute also requires the VA to tell the veteran what
evidence the veteran must provide and what evidence the VA will
94
attempt to obtain. In addition, the statute creating the Veterans
88. Brief for the Petitioner at ii, Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115 (1994) (No.
93-1128), 1994 WL 233282; see also STERN ET AL., supra note 87, at 221 (noting that
“[t]he rate of success for petitions for certiorari filed by the Solicitor General on
behalf of the United States is consistently far greater than the overall rate”).
89. See Brief for the Respondent in Opposition at 7, Scarborough v. Principi,
541 U.S. 401 (2004) (No. 02-1657), 2003 WL 22428008.
90. See Scarborough, 541 U.S. at 410; see also STERN ET AL., supra note 87, at 226
(“One of the prime purposes of the certiorari jurisdiction is to bring about
uniformity of decisions . . . among the federal courts of appeals.”). Although Gardner
and Scarborough were the Court’s only cases arising out of the VJRA judicial review
procedure, the Court also encountered veterans law in Mansell v. Mansell, a case in
which the Court reviewed a decision of a California state court and held that certain
military retirement pay was not community property divisible upon divorce. 490 U.S.
581, 594–95 (1989).
91. 129 S. Ct. 1696 (2009).
92. Id. at 1700.
93. Id. at 1700–01 (citing 38 U.S.C. § 5103A (2006); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159 (2008));
see also supra text accompanying notes 17–20 (discussing the duty to assist).
94. Sanders, 129 S. Ct. at 1700–01 (citing 38 U.S.C. § 5103; 38 C.F.R. § 3.159).
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Court instructs the court to “take due account of the rule of
95
prejudicial error.”
In Sanders, the Court reviewed two Federal
Circuit decisions that had held certain VA notice errors to be
96
In so
prejudicial, warranting reversal of the agency’s decision.
holding, the Federal Circuit had adopted a presumption that any
notice error is prejudicial and requires reversal unless the VA can
show that the error did not affect the “essential fairness” of the
97
proceeding.
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Federal Circuit’s
framework, noting that it was too rigid, too complex, and imposed
98
unreasonable burdens on the VA. The Court emphasized that a
“harmless error” framework, whether applied by an Article III court
of appeals or by the Veterans Court, must be a “case-specific
99
application of judgment, based upon examination of the record.”
Unlike Gardner and Scarborough, which resolved medical
malpractice and attorneys’ fees issues that arise only in an unusual
veterans case, Sanders has major significance for ordinary veterans
claims, given that over 4000 claims annually are appealed to the
100
Veterans Court. Thus, although it is not beyond dispute, one could
argue that the harmless-error question resolved in Sanders
represented a deeper foray into veterans law than the Court’s prior
decisions.
Shortly before this Article went to press, the Court decided its
second veterans case in less than two years. At issue in Henderson v.
Shinseki was whether the 120-day statutory deadline for filing a notice
of appeal to the Veterans Court is a “jurisdictional” deadline, which
may not be waived by the parties or equitably tolled, or a mere
101
“claims-processing rule,” which may be waived or tolled.
The en
banc Federal Circuit had held, in a 9–3 decision, that the deadline

95. See id. at 1701 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(2)).
96. Id. at 1702–03.
97. Id. at 1702.
98. Id. at 1700.
99. Id. at 1705.
100. See Annual Reports, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS, available at
http://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/documents/Annual_Report_FY_2009_October_1_200
8_to_September_30_2009.pdf [hereinafter VETERANS COURT ANNUAL REPORTS]
(noting that, for fiscal year 2009, 4725 new cases were filed in the Veterans Court).
101. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1200 (2011); see also 38 U.S.C.
7266(a) (2006) (“In order to obtain review by the Court of Appeals for Veterans
Claims of a final decision of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals, a person adversely
affected by such decision shall file a notice of appeal with the Court within 120 days
after the date on which notice of the decision is mailed . . . .”).
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for appealing a Board decision is a jurisdictional requirement.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Alito, unanimously
103
reversed.
The Court noted that, although the 120-day deadline for appealing
to the Veterans Court is established by statute, not all statutory
104
deadlines for appeal are jurisdictional.
In the Court’s view, the
“unique administrative scheme” for reviewing veterans benefits
determinations required a contextual inquiry into whether Congress
105
intended the deadline at issue to be jurisdictional.
The Court
emphasized the pro-veteran, informal, and non-adversarial nature of
the veterans benefits system in determining that Congress did not
106
intend the appeal deadline to have jurisdictional consequences.
The resolution of the procedural question in Henderson, like the
holding in Sanders overturning the Federal Circuit’s harmless-error
framework, is directly relevant to veterans cases only. Henderson did
not, for example, resolve a circuit split over a generally applicable
question of procedural law. Henderson did, however, implicate a
larger debate over which deadlines in federal law are jurisdictional
107
(and hence not subject to waiver or tolling) and which are not.
The Court’s opinion in Henderson will likely provide guidance to
future courts addressing similar questions in other areas of law. Yet,
like the opinion in Sanders, it will not directly impact legal analysis in
fields besides veterans law.
C. A New Dialogue Between the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit
It is too early to conclude whether the Supreme Court has
developed a genuine interest in veterans law, or whether the recent
increase in veterans cases is simply an anomaly. But whether the

102. Henderson v. Shinseki, 589 F.3d 1201, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc)
(citing Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007)).
103. Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1206. Justice Kagan was recused. Id. at 1207.
104. Id. at 1203.
105. Id. at 1204.
106. Id. at 1205–06.
107. See, e.g., Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1241 (2010)
(holding non-jurisdictional a requirement of the Copyright Act that a plaintiff
register the work before suing for infringement); John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v.
United States, 552 U.S. 130, 132–34 (2008) (holding jurisdictional a time limit on
suits filed against the federal government in the Court of Federal Claims); Bowles v.
Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007) (holding that the time limit for filing a notice of
appeal in a civil case is jurisdictional); see also Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500,
504 (2006) (holding non-jurisdictional a requirement of Title VII that an employerdefendant have fifteen or more employees); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 447
(2004) (holding non-jurisdictional a deadline contained in the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure for objecting to a debtor’s discharge).

2011]

2010 VETERANS BENEFITS LAW DECISIONS

1217

increase is a trend or an aberration, it is worthwhile to consider what
might be causing the Court’s veterans docket to grow. This inquiry is
interesting not only as an academic matter. It could also provide
insight into which future cases might be strong candidates for
Supreme Court review. I do not intend this to be an exhaustive
discussion of the factors driving the Court’s growing veterans docket.
Rather, I offer these preliminary observations simply to lay a
foundation for future discourse and to complement emerging
108
scholarship on factors shaping the Supreme Court’s current docket.
This emerging scholarship has focused on expert Supreme Court
advocates as a powerful force in shaping the Court’s docket, so the
most plausible explanation for the Court’s burgeoning veterans
docket might similarly involve the lawyers litigating the cases. The
Court accepted review in Sanders based on the Solicitor General’s
109
petition for certiorari.
In Henderson, the Court granted certiorari
based on a petition filed by attorneys from the appellate and
110
Supreme Court practice group at the law firm of Arnold & Porter.
These experienced Supreme Court litigators stood a much better
111
chance of securing review than the average veterans attorney, or, as
112
occurs frequently, the veteran proceeding pro se.

108. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Docket Capture at the High Court, 119 YALE L.J.
ONLINE 89, 89–90 & n.3 (2009), available at
http://yalelawjournal.org/2010/01/24/lazarus.html (suggesting that the Court’s
docket may be “captured” by “powerful economic interests” represented by an
“expert Supreme Court bar” “that know[s] best how to influence the decisionmaking
of the Justices at the jurisdictional stage”); Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before
and Within the Supreme Court: Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO.
L.J. 1487, 1490–91 (2008) [hereinafter Lazarus, Advocacy Matters] (similar); see also
Adam Liptak, Justices Offer Receptive Ear to Business Interests, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/19/us/19roberts.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all
(“The Roberts court’s engagement with business issues has risen along with the
emergence of a breed of lawyers specializing in Supreme Court advocacy, many of
them veterans of the United States solicitor general’s office, which represents the
federal government in the court. These specialists have been extraordinarily
successful, both in persuading the court to hear business cases and to rule in favor of
their clients.”).
109. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 7–9, Peake v. Sanders, 129 S. Ct. 1696
(2008) (No. 07-1209), 2008 WL 782560.
110. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 2, Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct.
1197 (2011) (No. 09-1036), 2010 WL 688025. Counsel of record on the petition was
a former Assistant to the Solicitor General. See Lisa S. Blatt, ARNOLD & PORTER LLP,
http://www.arnoldporter.com/professionals.cfm?u=BlattLisaS&action=view&id=540
9&bio_practice_id=893 (last visited Feb. 28, 2011).
111. See Lazarus, Advocacy Matters, supra note 108, at 1493–94, 1498–99 (examining
how attorneys from the Office of the Solicitor General, armed with expertise and the
trust of the Court, created profitable Supreme Court practice groups in private law
firms).
112. See VETERANS COURT ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 100, at 1 (noting that, for
fiscal year 2009, sixty-eight percent of veterans were self-represented upon filing the
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As the Henderson case suggests, veterans with non-frivolous claims
receive better representation today than ever before. In April 2007,
the Federal Circuit Bar Association created a pro bono program
matching seasoned Federal Circuit litigators with veterans who have
113
meritorious appeals but no legal counsel.
In addition, other
veterans organizations have in recent years recruited experienced
114
As a result of these
appellate litigators to handle veterans cases.
efforts, scores of veterans have been represented in the Federal
115
Circuit by firms with extensive experience in that court.
With
expert appellate litigators representing an increasing number of
veterans in the Federal Circuit and on certiorari to the Supreme
Court, veterans cases could begin to occupy the Court’s docket to a
116
greater extent than in the past.
Fueling the pro bono interest in veterans law and, indirectly, the
Court’s veterans docket, might be recent, disturbing examples of
stress on the veterans benefits system and disarray in the benefits
process. The Washington Post’s high-profile exposé of the Walter Reed
Medical Center called widespread attention to the squalid conditions
and bureaucratic confusion encountered by many wounded soldiers
117
upon return from battle.
Since then, many journalists and
appeal, and twenty-eight percent remained unrepresented upon the closure of the
case).
113. See Veterans Pro Bono Initiative, FEDERAL CIRCUIT BAR ASS’N, 1 (April 2007),
available at
http://memberconnections.com/olc/filelib/LVFC/cpages/11/Library/VETERANS
%20PRO%20BONO%20PROGRAM%20PDF.pdf (noting that the program was
created because of the increased number of pro se veterans appeals in recent years, a
number which may further increase in the future).
114. See Laura Parker, Lawyers Step Up to Help Veterans Gratis, U.S.A. TODAY, Nov. 26,
2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-11-26-valawyers_N.htm
(discussing the recruitment efforts of the National Veterans Legal Services Program).
115. See, e.g., Henderson v. Shinseki, 589 F.3d 1202, 1220 n.12 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en
banc) (Arnold & Porter LLP), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 1197 (2011); Moore v. Shinseki, 555
F.3d 1369, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Wiley Rein LLP); Phillips v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d
1358, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Sidley Austin LLP); Edwards v. Shinseki, 582 F.3d 1351,
1352 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, L.L.P.);
Cushman v. Shinseki, 576 F.3d 1290, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Morrison & Foerster
LLP); Comer v. Peake, 552 F.3d 1362, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Weil, Gotshal & Manges
LLP); Hogan v. Peake, 544 F.3d 1295, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Wilmer Cutler
Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP).
116. I do not intend to denigrate the hard work of solo and small-firm
practitioners who zealously represent the interests of their veteran clients. My point
is only that it is nearly beyond debate that a small number of lawyers—almost
invariably associated with large, corporate law firms—have significant influence on
the Supreme Court’s docket, see supra note 108, and that, to the extent those lawyers
become more involved in veterans cases, the more likely it is that the Supreme
Court’s veterans docket will grow.
117. Dana Priest & Anne Hull, Soldiers Face Neglect, Frustration at Army’s Top Medical
Facility, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/02/17/AR2007021701172.html.
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commentators have chronicled current and looming challenges for
the VA in dealing with veterans returning from Iraq and Afghanistan,
problems that are exacerbated by repeat deployments, waning public
support for military action, and economic difficulties awaiting
118
veterans at home.
It is the appalling treatment endured by
returning soldiers that has spurred many experienced litigators to
119
lend support to the cause of disabled veterans.
There are, however, ready responses to the claim that better
representation for veterans is driving the growth in veterans cases
before the Supreme Court. Importantly, although both Sanders and
Henderson are superficially relevant to veterans cases only, both
decisions fit into larger jurisprudential trends at the Court.
Henderson, for example, can be seen as part of the Court’s effort to
120
eliminate so-called drive-by jurisdictional rulings.
Because the
characterization of a rule as “jurisdictional” has drastic and
potentially wasteful consequences (by requiring the dismissal of a
121
case at an advanced stage of proceedings), the Court has taken
great pains in recent years to distinguish jurisdictional rules from
122
substantive-merits rules and claims-processing rules. Viewed in this
light, Henderson, which held that the deadline for appealing to the
Veterans Court is a mere claims-processing rule, is simply another
chapter in this larger jurisprudential narrative.
In addition, Sanders could arguably be viewed as one salvo in the
Supreme Court’s on-going quest to ensure that the Federal Circuit
applies the same procedural and remedial rules as other courts,
notwithstanding the Federal Circuit’s unique subject-matter
123
jurisdiction. For example, in recent years, the Supreme Court has
overturned the Federal Circuit’s inflexible rule that an injunction
should automatically follow a finding of patent infringement,

118. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 2, at 363 (citing Washington Post and New York Times
commentary); James Dao, Mental Health Problems Plague Returning Veterans, N.Y. TIMES,
July 17, 2009, at A10 (noting the significant number of Iraq and Afghanistan veterans
suffering from mental health problems); Erik Eckholm, For Veterans, a Weekend Pass
from Homelessness, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2009, at A13 (addressing the increasing number
of younger veterans from Iraq and Afghanistan who have ended up homeless);
see also Veterans for Common Sense v. Peake, 563 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1055 (N.D. Cal.
2008) (dismissing a suit challenging various aspects of veterans benefits system,
noting that “[t]he remedies to the problems, deficiencies, delays and inadequacies
complained of are not within the jurisdiction of this Court”).
119. Parker, supra note 114.
120. See Howard M. Wasserman, The Demise of “Drive-by Jurisdictional Rulings”,
105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 184, 184–85 (2011).
121. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202 (2011).
122. Wasserman, supra note 120, at 184–85.
123. See Castanias et al., supra note 4, at 815.
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emphasizing instead that the traditional multi-factor test for
124
injunctive relief should apply.
Similarly, the Supreme Court has
ruled that, when reviewing fact-finding by the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office, the Federal Circuit should apply the substantialevidence standard of the Administrative Procedure Act—the same
125
standard applied by regional circuits reviewing agency fact-finding.
Further examples of the Supreme Court’s disapproval of patent126
specific procedural and remedial rules abound.
In the context of
this case law, Sanders, which held that the Federal Circuit must apply
to veterans appeals the same harmless-error standard applied in other
fields of law, could be seen as just another example of the Supreme
Court insisting that the Federal Circuit use the same procedural and
127
remedial rules as other federal courts.
Working with such a small sample set, it is impossible to
confidently predict whether the recent increase in Supreme Court
veterans cases is a clear trend or simply an aberration. What is clear,
however, is that the foundation for a robust Supreme Court veterans
docket is in place. Improved representation for veterans pursuing
appeals to the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court as well as an
128
ever-increasing number of veterans seeking benefits should give rise
to scores of challenging questions of veterans law in the years ahead.
III. THE 2010 VETERANS BENEFITS DECISIONS
OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
One trend, however, clearly cuts against projections of a larger
number of Supreme Court veterans cases in the years to come. In

124. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391–92 (2006).
125. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 152 (1999) (overturning Federal Circuit
holding that the clearly erroneous standard applies).
126. See, e.g., Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S.
826, 832–34 (2002) (rejecting the argument that the phrase “arising under,” as
relevant to the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction over cases “arising under” the patent
laws, should be interpreted differently than the same phrase as relevant to general
federal question jurisdiction); Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Panduit Corp., 475 U.S. 809,
810–11 (1986) (per curiam) (emphasizing that the clearly erroneous standard of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) applies to district-court factual determinations
underlying patent law’s obviousness inquiry).
127. The Supreme Court’s rejection in Sanders of the Federal Circuit’s rigid
presumption of prejudicial error might also be seen as part of the Supreme Court’s
continuing displeasure with the Federal Circuit for favoring rigid, bright-line rules
over flexible standards. See Gregory A. Castanias, Douglas R. Cole, Jennifer L. Swize,
Vaishali Udupa & Tiffany D. Lipscomb-Jackson, Survey of the Federal Circuit’s Patent
Law Decisions in 2010: The Advent of the Rader Court, 60 Am. U. L. Rev. 845, 855–
62(2011).
128. See infra note 501 and accompanying text (noting that the number of claims
received annually by the VA has increased from 579,000 to 1,014,000 in 2009).
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2010, the Federal Circuit decided only fourteen veterans cases by
129
precedential opinion.
From 2007 to 2009, by contrast, the court
annually decided an average of twenty-five veterans cases by
130
Notwithstanding the smaller number of
precedential opinion.
precedential decisions, the opinions, as usual, covered a wide range
of veterans law issues. Although it is difficult to trace a coherent
theme through decisions on such varied topics, many of the decisions
reflect a preference for a flexible, standards-based approach to
deciding veterans claims. The decisions tend to reject categorical
rules, whether those rules were adopted by the Veterans Court (such
as a rule automatically rejecting the opinions of physicians who do
131
not review a veteran’s in-service medical record), or proposed by
claimants (such as a rule that the VA must always provide a medical
132
examination as part of the duty to assist).
This Part summarizes each one of this year’s precedential Federal
Circuit veterans rulings. As would be expected in a comprehensive
survey, some of the opinions discussed are highly significant for
future cases while others are fact-specific and less likely to have longterm doctrinal relevance. Thus, while I provide a summary of each
case, I offer more extensive commentary on the decisions that may be
important to veterans going forward.
I discuss the cases in the order in which the issues they address
would generally be encountered in a benefits proceeding, beginning
with the VA’s statutory duty to assist a veteran in developing a benefits
claim. I then turn to the questions of whether a veteran’s disability is
connected to military service and, if so, the date on which the
133
benefits award should be effective. I conclude by discussing matters
of procedure (such as the revision of erroneous claim decisions and
the VA’s implicit denial of claims it mistakenly leaves pending) and
compensation for injuries resulting from VA medical treatment.

129. As might be expected given the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction to review only
questions of law in veterans cases, the majority of Federal Circuit non-precedential
dispositions were dismissals for lack of jurisdiction. One can confirm this assertion
by searching Westlaw’s Federal Circuit database (CTAF) for decisions on review from
the Veterans Court.
130. See infra addendum fig.1 (illustrating the number of precedential veterans
opinions issued by the Federal Circuit each year since 2000); see also infra addendum
fig.2 (noting a similar decrease in the total number of veterans cases decided by the
Federal Circuit).
131. Gardin v. Shinseki, 613 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
132. Waters v. Shinseki, 601 F.3d 1274, 1278–79 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
133. The Federal Circuit in 2010 issued no precedential opinions discussing VA
ratings decisions, so this Part does not discuss that significant aspect of VA
adjudication.
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A. Duty to Assist
The Federal Circuit decided three cases in 2010 clarifying the
scope of the duty to assist. One case addressed the VA’s duty to
obtain relevant medical records and a pair of cases discussed the VA’s
duty to provide medical examinations to help substantiate claims. I
discuss each issue in turn.
1.

Medical records
The statutory duty to assist requires the VA to make “reasonable
efforts” to help a veteran obtain the evidence needed to establish the
134
claim for benefits.
In making “reasonable efforts,” the VA is not
required to obtain all of the veteran’s medical records. Rather, the
135
VA need only obtain records that are relevant to the claim. In Golz
136
v. Shinseki, the Federal Circuit elaborated on which medical records
are considered relevant, holding that the VA need only obtain
records that relate to the injury for which the veteran is seeking
benefits and that have a “reasonable possibility” of helping to
137
substantiate the claim.
138
The veteran, Julius Golz, served in the Navy from 1969 to 1972.
In 1995, the Social Security Administration found that Golz was
139
disabled due to back and leg pain caused by a car accident.
The
Social Security decision did not discuss any psychiatric or mental
140
health issues.
Golz then sought benefits from the VA for service141
connected post-traumatic stress disorder. The VA denied the claim
and Golz appealed to the Board, asserting that the VA violated its
duty to assist by not obtaining the medical records accompanying the
142
Social Security decision. The Board affirmed the denial of benefits,
noting that it reviewed a copy of the Social Security decision itself,
which did not mention a psychiatric disorder, indicating that the
accompanying medical records would not be relevant to Golz’s post143
traumatic stress disorder claim.
The Veterans Court affirmed, as
144
did the Federal Circuit.

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

38 U.S.C. § 5103A(a)(1) (2006).
McGee v. Peake, 511 F.3d 1352, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
590 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
Id. at 1321.
Id. at 1319.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1319–20.
Id. at 1320.
Id. at 1320, 1323.
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Writing for the court, Judge Moore began by making clear that the
duty to assist requires the VA to obtain only medical records that are
relevant to the claim at hand:
There can be no doubt that Congress intended VA to assist
veterans in obtaining records for compensation claims, but it is
equally clear that Congress only obligated the VA to obtain
“relevant” records. The duty to assist requires the Secretary to
make reasonable efforts to obtain “evidence necessary to
145
substantiate the claimant’s claim for a benefit.”

The court then outlined what it considered to be relevant records:
“Relevant records for the purpose of § 5103A are those records that
[1] relate to the injury for which the claimant is seeking benefits and
[2] have a reasonable possibility of helping to substantiate the
146
veteran’s claim.”
The court noted that the Social Security decision, which primarily
addressed claims of back pain, did not indicate that the proceeding
147
examined Golz’s mental health.
Because the Veterans Court
applied the correct legal standard in assessing the relevance of the
Social Security medical records (whether the records were related to
Golz’s mental health or might help establish his claim), the Federal
148
Circuit affirmed.
The opinion also contained important guidance for the VA and the
Veterans Court in applying the “relevance” standard. The court
emphasized that a record’s relevance cannot always be determined
149
without reviewing the record itself.
The VA must “examine the
information it has related to [the] medical records” and obtain the
records if there is a “specific reason” to believe that the record
150
contains pertinent information.
“In close or uncertain cases,” the
court cautioned, “the VA should be guided by the principles
151
underlying this uniquely pro-claimant system.”
The standards-based approach of Golz makes plain that the VA has
no rigid obligation to obtain medical records that, judging by the
information the VA possesses, appear irrelevant.
But if the
information suggests a reasonable possibility that the records could help

145. Id. at 1321 (quoting 38 U.S.C. §§ 5103A(a)(1), (b)(1) (2006)).
146. Id. (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1316 (8th ed. 2004)).
147. Id. at 1322.
148. Id. at 1322–23.
149. Id. at 1323.
150. Id.
151. Id. (emphasizing that the VA must “fully and sympathetically develop the
veteran’s claim to its optimum before deciding it on the merits” (quoting McGee v.
Peake, 511 F.3d 1352, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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establish the claim, the VA must retrieve the records.
Given the
court’s emphasis that the relevant inquiry should be resolved in the
claimant’s favor in close cases, the VA should keep the bar for
establishing relevance low.
2.

Medical examinations
The statutory duty to assist also requires the VA to provide the
veteran with a medical examination when necessary to make a
153
decision on a claim for benefits. Obtaining a VA-provided medical
examination is often crucial to establishing a claim for serviceconnected benefits. Without a VA-provided examination, the veteran
must pay for the specialized opinion of a private physician.
Moreover, the private physician will likely be unfamiliar with the
veteran’s service medical record and the evidentiary standards unique
154
to veterans claims.
In 2010, the Federal Circuit decided a pair of
cases that, taken together, show that it is difficult, but not impossible,
for a veteran to obtain a VA medical examination based solely on the
veteran’s own assertions of service connection, as opposed to medical
evidence of service connection.
a.

Unsupported lay assertions of service connection
155

In Waters v. Shinseki, the Federal Circuit held that the duty to
assist does not require the VA to grant medical examinations
156
“routinely and virtually automatically.” Rather, the VA must grant a
medical examination only when the claimant satisfies a three-part test
157
set forth in the statute.
George Waters was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia while
158
serving on active military duty. After Waters left the service, he was
159
diagnosed with hypertension, depression, and diabetes.
Waters
sought compensation from the VA for these newly diagnosed
disabilities, claiming that antipsychotic drugs administered during
160
service caused his hypertension and diabetes.
The VA denied the
claims, finding that there was no competent evidence of connection
between Waters’s in-service schizophrenia and his current diagnoses
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 1322.
38 U.S.C. § 5103A(d)(1) (2006).
See Duenas v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 512, 521 (2004) (Hagel, J., concurring).
601 F.3d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
Id. at 1278–79.
Id. at 1276–77 (citing 38 U.S.C. § 5013A(d)(1)).
Id. at 1275.
Id.
Id.
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161

of diabetes and hypertension.
On appeal to the Veterans Court,
Waters claimed that the VA did not satisfy its duty to assist because it
162
had not provided a medical examination.
The Veterans Court
rejected the argument, noting that the only evidence that Waters’s
current disability was connected to his military service was Waters’s
own statements, and that his lay assertions did not trigger the VA’s
163
duty to provide a medical examination.
164
The Federal Circuit affirmed in an opinion by Judge Friedman.
The court began by reiterating that the VA is required to provide a
medical examination only when the examination is “necessary to
165
make a decision on the claim.”
The court pointed out that the
statute provides a three-part test for determining when an
examination is “necessary” to make a decision:
The [VA] shall treat an examination or opinion as being necessary
to make a decision on a claim . . . if the evidence of record before
the [VA] . . . (A) contains competent evidence that the claimant
has a current disability, or persistent or recurrent symptoms of
disability; and (B) indicates that the disability or symptoms may be
associated with the claimant’s active military, naval, or air service;
but (C) does not contain sufficient medical evidence for the [VA]
166
to make a decision on the claim.

The court emphasized that each subsection imposes its own
evidentiary standard, requiring either “competent evidence,”
167
“evidence . . . indicat[ing],” and “medical evidence,” respectively.
The court thus faulted the Board for finding that Waters presented
no “competent” medical evidence of a nexus between his service and
his disability, when the pertinent subsection, subsection B, requires
168
only “evidence . . . indicat[ing]” service connection.
But the
Federal Circuit found this error to be harmless because the Veterans
Court had found that the record contained no evidence of service
169
connection, other than Waters’s own statement. The court rejected
Waters’s argument that his lay assertion of service connection,

161. Id.
162. Id. at 1276.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1275.
165. Id. at 1276 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(d)(1) (2006)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
166. Id. at 1276–77 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(d)(2)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
167. Id. at 1277.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1277–78.
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standing alone, entitled him to a medical examination. The court
noted that if it were to accept this argument, it would render
superfluous “the carefully drafted statutory standards governing the
171
provision of medical examinations.”
Yet Waters’s argument finds support in the plain language of
subsection B, which mandates a medical examination if there is
172
“evidence . . . indicat[ing]” service connection.
Given that
subsection A explicitly modifies the word “evidence” with the
adjective “competent,” the omission of any modifier in subsection B
173
appears to require only some evidence, “competent” or not.
The
Federal Circuit’s interpretation, however, reflects concerns about
upsetting Congress’s intent and about the consequences of a literal
174
reading of subsection B.
If one were to read subsection B as
requiring only “some” evidence of service connection, any veteran
who asserted service connection, even without any persuasive
175
evidence, would likely be entitled to a medical examination.
If
Congress had intended for claimants to receive medical examinations
practically on demand, it would not have drafted the statute to allow
176
for medical examinations only when “necessary” to decide a claim.
Perhaps Congress, through a more carefully drafted definition of the
term “necessary,” could have saved the court the trouble of
interpreting around the statute’s plain language.
b.

Persuasive lay testimony of service connection

Although the court in Waters held that a veteran may not receive a
medical examination based on an unsupported assertion of service
connection, the Federal Circuit, in its 2010 decision in Colantonio v.
177
Shinseki, clarified that sufficiently persuasive lay testimony can,
178
standing alone, entitle a veteran to a medical examination.

170. Id. at 1278.
171. Id.
172. 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(d)(2)(B) (2006).
173. Compare id. § 5103A(d)(2)(A) (requiring “competent evidence” of a “current
disability”), with id. § 5103A(d)(2)(B) (requiring “evidence . . . indicat[ing]” possible
service connection).
174. Waters, 601 F.3d at 1278.
175. See id. (“At oral argument Waters contended that his conclusory generalized
statement that his service illness caused his present medical problems was enough to
entitle him to a medical examination under the standard of subsection B. Since all
veterans could make such a statement, this theory would . . . require the [VA] to
provide such examinations as a matter of course in virtually every veteran’s disability
case.”).
176. 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(d)(1).
177. 606 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
178. Id. at 1382.

2011]

2010 VETERANS BENEFITS LAW DECISIONS

1227
179

Quareno Colantonio served in the Army during World War II. In
1999, he filed a claim with the VA, seeking compensation for a back
180
injury connected to his military service.
Because there was no
record of Colantonio having suffered a back injury while in service,
181
the VA denied the claim.
The Board agreed that there was no
service connection because the only evidence of an in-service back
injury came from Colantonio’s own statements and, in the Board’s
opinion, Colantonio lacked competence to provide medical opinion
182
testimony. The Veterans Court agreed, noting that Colantonio’s lay
testimony “cannot provide the requisite medical nexus” and that “[a]
lay person is not competent to opine on matters requiring medical
183
knowledge, such as etiology of a condition or nexus.”
On appeal,
the Federal Circuit determined that this ruling was inconsistent with
184
Waters and remanded.
The court noted that the Veterans Court’s ruling could be
interpreted to mean “that a veteran’s lay testimony can never be
sufficient in itself to satisfy the nexus requirement in section
185
5103A(d)(2)(B).” Such a ruling, the Federal Circuit noted, would
conflict with Waters, which made clear that subsection B requires only
evidence “indicat[ing] that the disability . . . may be associated with . .
. military . . . service” and does not necessarily require “competent
medical evidence” to establish a nexus between service and a later
186
disability. The court concluded: “We reiterate the interpretation of
subparagraph B adopted in Waters: that medically competent
evidence is not required in every case to ‘indicate’ that the claimant’s
187
disability ‘may be associated’ with the claimant’s service.”
It is often not possible to establish, through lay evidence, a nexus
between a current disability and military service. But the Federal
Circuit’s 2010 decisions in Golz, Waters, and Colantonio reflect an effort
to balance the interests of veterans, who might not be able to afford
persuasive medical evidence, with a desire to protect the scarce
medical resources of the VA. In some cases, like Waters, the lay
188
evidence may be too self-serving to warrant a VA medical exam.

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id. at 1379.
Id.
Id. at 1380.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1382.
Id. at 1381 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1381–82 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(d)(2)(B) (2006)).
Id. at 1382.
Waters v. Shinseki, 601 F.3d 1274, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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But, as the court made clear in Colantonio, subparagraph B requires
only a “minimal showing” of nexus that can sometimes be satisfied by
189
persuasive lay testimony, such as detailed statements of family
members, friends, and coworkers regarding the symptoms and history
190
of the disability and the effect of the disability on the veteran.
B. Service Connection
As this discussion of Waters and Colantonio suggests, the required
nexus between the current disability and military service is typically
established through medical evidence: a statement by a physician
191
expressly connecting the veteran’s disability to military service. For
certain veterans suffering from certain diseases, however, Congress
and the VA have adopted legal presumptions that the diseases are
service connected, obviating the need for the veteran to present
192
evidence of a nexus. For veterans whose claims are subject to these
presumptions, the VA must show that a particular veteran’s disease is
193
not service connected.
In summarizing the Federal Circuit’s 2010 decisions on principles
of service connection, I first discuss cases addressing the medical
evidence necessary to establish the required connection between a
current disability and military service. I then address cases examining
the presumptions for establishing service connection. Finally, I
discuss a series of cases that discuss principles of service connection as
applied to a range of different disabilities that are not presumed to
be service connected.
1.

Medical evidence
a.

Private physicians

While veterans often rely on reports by VA physicians to establish
service connection, they may also submit evidence from private
194
195
physicians. In Gardin v. Shinseki, the Federal Circuit held that the
189. Colantonio, 606 F.3d at 1382.
190. See VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL, supra note 9, at 895–96.
191. Id. at 104.
192. Id. at 125; see, e.g., 38 U.S.C. §§ 1111–12, 1116, 1118 (2006) (setting forth
various presumptions applicable to benefits proceedings).
193. See VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL, supra note 9, at 125.
194. See 38 U.S.C. § 5125 (“For purposes of establishing any claim for benefits . . .
a report of a medical examination administered by a private physician that is
provided by a claimant in support of a claim for benefits . . . may be accepted without
a requirement for confirmation by an examination by a physician employed by the
Veterans Health Administration if the report is sufficiently complete to be adequate
for the purpose of adjudicating such claim.”).
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VA may not automatically discount a private physician’s opinion
merely because the physician did not review the veteran’s in-service
196
medical record.
197
Wayne Gardin served in the Air Force from 1959 to 1963. While
198
in service, he developed symptoms consistent with diabetes.
He
was, however, not diagnosed with the disease until 1971, after he had
199
been discharged.
The VA denied his initial claim for benefits because his service
200
records did not indicate treatment for diabetes.
To establish a
nexus between his service and diabetes, Gardin then submitted (1)
lay testimony by his family and friends stating that he had diabetes
around the time of discharge and (2) medical reports by three
201
physicians summarizing Gardin’s history of diabetes.
The Board
found the lay testimony not credible because it conflicted with the
202
medical evidence.
The Board also found Gardin’s medical
203
The Board rejected the report of one
evidence not credible.
particular physician because the report did not indicate that the
204
doctor reviewed Gardin’s “actual service medical records.”
The
Veterans Court affirmed, but the Federal Circuit vacated that
205
ruling.
The Federal Circuit noted that the statute expressly permits
206
veterans to submit reports from private physicians and that the
implementing regulation requires only that a physician issuing a
207
report be “qualified through education, training, or experience.”
The Federal Circuit held that the Veterans Court erred by holding
that a private physician must review service medical records before
208
opining on service connection.
The court also made clear,
however, that a private physician’s failure to review a service medical
209
file may make the expert’s opinion less credible.
195. 613 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
196. Id. at 1378–79.
197. Id. at 1375.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1376.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1376–77.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1377, 1380.
206. Id. at 1378 (citing 38 U.S.C. § 5125 (2006)).
207. Id. (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(a)(1) (2009)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
208. Id. at 1378–79.
209. See id. (noting that “a review of the veteran’s service medical records may
have significance to the process of formulating a medically valid and well-reasoned
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Lay testimony

In addition to using the testimony of physicians, a veteran may
submit the testimony of lay witnesses to establish service connection.
210
In its 2007 decision in Jandreau v. Nicholson, the Federal Circuit held
that lay evidence can be sufficient to establish a medical diagnosis
when: “(1) a layperson is competent to identify the medical
condition, (2) the layperson is reporting a contemporaneous medical
diagnosis, or (3) lay testimony describing symptoms at the time
211
supports a later diagnosis by a medical professional.”
In Gardin, the case discussed immediately above, the veteran also
claimed that the Veterans Court had erroneously required
contemporaneous medical evidence before considering lay evidence
212
to be credible.
The Veterans Court had affirmed the Board’s
decision to discount the lay statements of Gardin’s family and friends
because they were based on Gardin’s own statements, vague, and
213
inconsistent with other evidence.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit
agreed with Gardin that, in light of Jandreau, the Board may not
require contemporaneous medical evidence before considering lay
214
evidence to be credible. The Federal Circuit determined, however,
that the Board had not required contemporaneous medical
215
evidence. Rather, the Board had found, as a matter of fact, that the
216
statements were not credible.
Whether the Board had correctly
weighed the evidence was a question of fact beyond the Federal
217
Circuit’s jurisdiction.
Similar to its duty-to-assist decisions in Golz, Waters, and Colantonio,
the court in Gardin eschewed bright-line rules governing VA actions
and decisions, instead encouraging the VA to engage in a holistic
review of the available evidence before making a decision on any
issue. The contextual, standards-based approach of Gardin is also
consistent with the statute governing the evidence that the VA must
opinion,” but that there is no “categorical rule excluding all private medical reports
that [do] not include a review of the veteran’s service medical records”) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citing Nieves-Rodriguez v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 285, 304
(2008)).
210. 492 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
211. Id. at 1377.
212. Gardin, 613 F.3d at 1379.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 1379–80.
216. Id. at 1380.
217. See id. (“The Board, as factfinder, had the obligation to determine whether
Mr. Gardin’s lay evidence was credible; the Board concluded it was not. . . . Whether
the Veterans Court was correct in affirming the Board’s credibility determination is a
question of fact beyond this court’s jurisdiction.”).
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consider in deciding benefits claims. That statute requires the VA to
adopt regulations “requiring that in each case where a veteran is
seeking service-connection for any disability[,] due consideration
shall be given to,” among other things, “all pertinent medical and lay
218
evidence.” By rejecting categorical rules excluding certain types of
evidence, the court in Gardin made clear that “all pertinent . . .
219
Evidence from a private
evidence” really means all evidence.
physician may not be excluded simply because the physician did not
220
review the veteran’s service medical record.
Rather, the failure to
review the service record may simply be considered by the VA in
221
determining the persuasiveness of the physician’s report. Likewise,
the VA may not require that contemporaneous medical evidence
222
always support lay evidence. Instead, the VA must consider the lay
evidence, but may discount the evidence if it is inconsistent with the
223
medical record or is otherwise unpersuasive.
2.

Presumed service connection
The veterans statute lists a wide variety of diseases that are
presumed to be service connected when suffered by certain veterans,
224
For Vietnam veterans, Congress
such as former prisoners of war.
has taken a more complex approach. In 38 U.S.C. § 1116, Congress
listed certain diseases that are associated with herbicides used during
the Vietnam War and are presumed to be service connected for
225
Vietnam veterans.
But Congress also ordered the VA, on an ongoing basis, to consider whether scientific evidence warrants
226
expanding the list of diseases presumed to be service connected. In
one important non-precedential Federal Circuit case decided in
2010, the court ordered the VA to comply with its duty to issue
227
regulations under this statute.
Congress enacted § 1116 as part of the Agent Orange Act of
228
1991.
Section 3 of that Act requires the VA to contract with the

218. 38 U.S.C. § 1154(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
219. Gardin, 613 F.3d at 1379.
220. Id. at 1378.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 1379.
223. Id. at 1380.
224. See 38 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (2006).
225. Id. § 1116(a) (listing non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, certain forms of soft-tissue
sarcoma, chloracne, Hodgkin’s disease, porphyria cutanea tarda, respiratory cancers,
multiple myeloma, and type-2 diabetes as qualifying diseases).
226. Id. § 1116(b)–(c).
227. In re Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 392 F. App’x 858, 859, 861 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
228. See Pub. L. No. 102-4, § 2, 105 Stat. 11, 11–13 (1991).
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National Academy of Sciences to study the relationship between
exposure to herbicides used during the Vietnam War and certain
229
diseases.
Under the statute, when the Academy sends a report on
certain diseases to the VA, the VA must consider whether a
presumption of service connection is warranted for the diseases in
230
the report.
The statute requires the VA to issue proposed
regulations setting forth its determination and, within ninety days of
231
issuing the proposed regulations, to issue final regulations.
On
March 25, 2010, the VA issued proposed regulations adopting a
presumption of service connection for B-cell leukemia, Parkinson’s
232
disease, and certain types of heart disease. The ninety-day deadline
233
for issuing the final rule passed without any action by the VA.
Groups of veterans filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with the
Federal Circuit, seeking an order compelling the VA to adopt a final
234
rule.
The Federal Circuit granted the writ. The court emphasized that
the ninety-day deadline was not merely guidance, but a mandatory
235
statutory requirement that the VA had no discretion to disregard.
Because the veterans’ right to VA action was clear, the court ordered
the VA to issue a final regulation within thirty days of its August 2,
236
2010 order. As discussed in Part IV.A below, the VA issued the final
regulation on August 31, 2010.
3.

Post-traumatic stress disorder
Another major regulatory development in veterans law this year
was the VA’s amendment of the regulation defining the evidence
required to establish service connection for a claim of post-traumatic
237
stress disorder (PTSD).
As discussed below, the amendment
eliminated a requirement that the veteran provide corroborating
229. Id. § 3, 105 Stat. at 13.
230. 38 U.S.C. § 1116(c).
231. Id. § 1116(c)(2).
232. See In re Paralyzed Veterans, 392 F. App’x at 859.
233. Id.
234. Id. Mandamus is an extraordinary writ by which a court may, among other
things, compel a government official to take an action that has been unlawfully
withheld. In the field of patent law, the Federal Circuit has recently made waves by
aggressively using mandamus to compel the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Texas to transfer infringement cases to more convenient fora. See Paul R.
Gugliuzza, The New Federal Circuit Mandamus 1–5 (Feb. 18, 2011) (unpublished
manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1734419.
235. In re Paralyzed Veterans, 392 F. App’x at 860.
236. Id.
237. Stressor Determinations for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 75 Fed. Reg.
39,843 (July 13, 2010) (to be codified at 38 C.F.R. pt. 3).
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evidence of an in-service stressor if the claimed stressor is related to
the fear of hostile military or terrorist activity and is consistent with
238
the veteran’s military service.
239
In Arzio v. Shinseki, the Federal Circuit made clear that, to
establish service connection for PTSD, a veteran must satisfy the
three-part test set forth in 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f), unless a more specific
240
standard applies (such as the standard in the amended regulation).
Section 3.304(f) requires the veteran to provide medical evidence
that the veteran has been diagnosed with PTSD, medical evidence
supporting a link between the current PTSD symptoms and a stressor
that occurred while in service, and credible evidence that the claimed
241
stressor actually occurred.
242
Michael Arzio served in the Army and Navy from 1959 to 1962.
243
He did not participate in combat while in service.
In 1990, Arzio
244
The VA noted that
sought compensation from the VA for PTSD.
Arzio was indeed receiving treatment for PTSD, but found that Arzio
had not provided evidence of the in-service stressors that he claimed
245
occurred, as is required by § 3.304(f). On appeal, Arzio argued that
he could establish service connection for PTSD without proving an
246
in-service stressor.
He claimed that a more general standard set
forth in 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 provided an alternative means for
247
establishing service connection for PTSD.
But § 3.303 is, as the court noted, “a broad regulatory provision
248
addressing general service connection principles.”
Rather than
providing a substantive standard for establishing PTSD, § 3.303
simply states that “[s]ervice connection connotes many factors but
basically it means that the facts, shown by evidence, establish that a
particular injury or disease resulting in disability was incurred
249
coincident with service in the Armed Forces.”
Section 3.304 itself
makes clear that “[t]he basic considerations relating to service
connection are stated in § 3.303,” and that § 3.304 contains specific
“criteria” for evaluating claims of service connection for certain
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

See infra Part IV.A.
602 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
Id. at 1347.
38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) (2010).
Arzio, 602 F.3d at 1344.
Id.
Id. at 1345.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1345–46.
Id. at 1346.
Id. (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (2010)).
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250

disabilities, including PTSD.
As the Federal Circuit noted, “when
sections 3.303 and 3.304 are read together, it is evident that they do
not provide alternative methods of establishing service connection,
but instead work in tandem to delineate the circumstances under
251
which a veteran can establish service connection for PTSD.” Under
basic principles of regulatory construction, “the specific requirements
of section 3.304(f) . . . take precedence over the general principles
252
related to service connection set forth in section 3.303.”
Arzio thus establishes that specific regulatory provisions defining
service connection trump the general standard of § 3.303. This rule
does not, however, always operate to the veteran’s detriment. For
253
example, the court in Arzio discussed Combee v. Brown, a case in
which the Federal Circuit held that § 3.303 and § 3.311, which
establishes a presumption of service connection for certain illnesses
related to the testing or use of atomic weapons, provide alternative
254
means of establishing service connection for those illnesses. Thus,
under Combee and Arzio, any regulation that relaxes the requirements
for establishing service connection for certain classes of veterans
should be construed as an alternative means of establishing service
connection for PTSD.
4.

Rare diseases
In veterans cases, the Federal Circuit lacks jurisdiction to review
fact-finding or the application of law to fact by the Veterans Court or
255
the VA.
This includes the determination of whether a veteran’s
256
In Bastien v.
death or disability is connected to military service.
257
Shinseki, the court dismissed an appeal that challenged the VA’s
determination that a rare form of cancer was not connected to in258
A dissenting opinion by Judge
service radiation exposure.
Newman, however, raised an important question about the legal
standard for determining service connection in the case of rare
259
diseases.
250. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(a) (emphasis added).
251. Arzio, 602 F.3d at 1347.
252. Id.
253. 34 F.3d 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
254. Arzio, 602 F.3d at 1348 (citing Combee, 34 F.3d at 1043–44).
255. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2) (2006).
256. Waltzer v. Nicholson, 447 F.3d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
257. 599 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
258. Id. at 1303, 1307.
259. See id. at 1308 (Newman, J., dissenting) (arguing that the correct legal
standard for determining whether a rare disease was caused by military service “is not
whether a preponderance of evidence establishes that causation was more likely than
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During his military service, Robert Bastien worked on experiments
260
that tested the effects of radiation on monkeys. Bastien placed the
monkeys in a nuclear reactor where they were exposed to radiation
261
and removed the monkeys after exposure. About twenty years after
he left the service, Bastien died of pneumonia resulting from
262
Waldenström’s macroglobulinemia, a rare blood cancer.
Bastien
263
also had been diagnosed with rare forms of lymphoma.
Bastien and, later, his widow, sought benefits for Mr. Bastien’s
illness and death, which they asserted were caused by Mr. Bastien’s in264
service exposure to radiation.
Mrs. Bastien and the VA presented
265
conflicting evidence to the Board.
Mrs. Bastien offered the
266
One testified that her husband’s cancer
testimony of two doctors.
“could be related to radiation exposure,” and another testified that it
was “plausible” that in-service radiation exposure caused Mr. Bastien’s
267
illness and death.
The VA, on the other hand, presented the
testimony of two doctors who contended, respectively, that it was
“unlikely” or “extremely unlikely” that Mr. Bastien’s radiation
268
exposure caused his cancer.
The Board determined that the
testimony of the VA witnesses had greater probative value, and
269
270
denied the claim. The Veterans Court affirmed.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to
271
Writing for the court,
consider the cause of Mr. Bastien’s death.
Judge Friedman noted that Mrs. Bastien’s main argument was that
the Board gave too much weight to the VA’s expert opinions and not
272
enough weight to her experts’ evidence.
This argument, Judge

not, but whether it is medically possible that the in-service activity caused the
cancer”).
260. Id. at 1303 (majority opinion).
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 1303–04 (also describing the remainder of Mrs. Bastien’s evidence,
which included her own calculations of the doses of radiation her husband received
and a letter from a private nuclear engineering company).
268. Id. at 1304.
269. Id.
270. See id. at 1305 (observing that the Board is responsible for “review[ing] and
assess[ing] the credibility and probative value of the evidence of record” and that the
Board’s justifications for crediting the VA’s experts over the widow’s experts were
“plausible and therefore not clearly erroneous”).
271. Id. at 1305–06.
272. Id.
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Friedman noted, was an impermissible challenge to the evaluation
273
and weighing of evidence.
Dissenting, Judge Newman identified a legal error that, in her view,
274
She noted that the
corrupted the VA’s and the courts’ analyses.
Board’s decision and the majority’s ruling assumed that the proper
standard for determining service connection was whether the
radiation exposure was “more likely than not” to have caused Mr.
275
Bastien’s rare cancer.
But, Judge Newman noted, “the cause of
Waldenstrom’s macroglobulinemia is not known,” and “all of the
medical witnesses, whichever side retained them, stated that it was
not possible to know whether Mr. Bastien’s . . . cancer was traceable”
276
to his in-service radiation exposure.
Because it was impossible to determine what caused Mr. Bastien’s
rare disease, Judge Newman proposed a different evidentiary
277
standard for service connection in claims involving rare diseases.
Instead of a preponderance of the evidence standard, she proposed a
standard that asked “whether it is medically possible that the in278
service activity caused the cancer.”
This lower standard would
apply, Judge Newman wrote, “when the disease is sufficiently rare that
279
adequate data to prove or disprove causation do not exist.”
Judge Newman’s analysis is persuasive. The lower standard she
proposed accords with the pro-claimant ideal of the veterans benefits
system. More importantly, her “medical possibility” standard is
consistent with Congress’s mandate that factual doubt in benefits
280
The VA’s own
proceedings be resolved in favor of the veteran.
regulations provide that when the evidence “does not satisfactorily
prove or disprove” the “service origin” of the claimed disability, the
281
doubt should be resolved in the veteran’s favor.
In the case of a
disease whose cause is unknown, it seems as if the VA is resolving
doubt against the veteran when it credits medical opinions stating

273. Id. at 1306. The Federal Circuit also rejected Mrs. Bastien’s argument that
the Board erred by not requiring the VA to affirmatively establish the qualifications
of its medical experts. Id.
274. See id. at 1307–08 (Newman, J., dissenting).
275. Id. at 1308.
276. Id. at 1307–08.
277. Id. at 1308.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.; see also 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b) (2006) (“When there is an approximate
balance of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the
determination of a [claim for benefits], the [VA] shall give the benefit of the doubt
to the claimant.”).
281. 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (2010).
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that service connection is “unlikely” over medical opinions stating
that service connection is “plausible.”
5.

Dental conditions
Under 38 U.S.C. § 1712(a)(1)(C), veterans are entitled to
outpatient services for dental conditions that are “due to combat
282
283
wounds or other service trauma.”
In Nielson v. Shinseki, the
Federal Circuit held that “service trauma . . . does not include the
284
intended result of proper medical treatment.”
285
Thomas Nielson served in the Air Force in the 1950s. During his
service in the Korean War, he had most of his teeth extracted,
286
apparently because of an infection.
In 1991, Nielson sought new
dentures from the VA under § 1712(a)(1)(C), claiming that he
287
Relying on an opinion
needed them because of “service trauma.”
of the VA general counsel that “‘service trauma’ does not include the
intended effects of treatment provided during the veteran’s military
288
service,” the Board rejected Nielson’s claim.
The Veterans Court
289
and the Federal Circuit both affirmed.
Citing dictionary definitions of “trauma,” the Federal Circuit first
concluded that the word referred to “an injury or wound to a living
290
body caused by the application of external force or violence.” The
court noted that the act of pulling teeth, an external physical force,
291
The court concluded, however, that
could fit this definition.
Congress did not intend to include proper medical treatment in the
292
definition of trauma.
The court first noted that if it were to construe “trauma” to include
any injury suffered during service, it would render the word “service”
superfluous, because the first portion of the statute already requires
293
the injury to be connected to service.
Moreover, the court
emphasized that the general phrase “service trauma” should be
282. 38 U.S.C. § 1712(a)(1)(C).
283. 607 F.3d 802 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
284. Id. at 804 (internal quotation marks omitted).
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing General Counsel Precedent
Opinion, Dental Care Eligibility—Nielson v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 22 (1994),
VAOPGCPREC 5-97 (Jan. 22, 1997)).
289. Id. at 805, 809.
290. Id. at 806 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2432
(unabr. ed. 1961)).
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
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interpreted to refer to the same kind of injuries as those that
294
preceded the phrase in the statute. In the court’s view, Congress’s
use of the preceding phrase “combat wounds” suggested that “service
trauma” should likewise cover only injuries incurred while
295
performing military duties.
C. Effective Date
When the VA awards benefits, it also sets an effective date for the
benefits payments. The effective date chosen by the VA is a fruitful
source of litigation because it determines the amount of back
296
payments due to a veteran. In 2010, the Federal Circuit dealt with
many issues related to effective dates, from the special rule granting
an early effective date for claims filed within one year of the veteran’s
discharge, to rulings increasing or decreasing benefits compensation.
1.

Claims filed within one year of discharge
The setting of the effective date is left by statute to the VA’s
297
judgment.
Under the VA’s regulations, the effective date is
normally the later of the date the veteran filed the claim or the date
298
the claim arose. The only specific statutory requirement is that the
effective date must be no earlier than the date on which the veteran
299
applied for benefits.
If, however, the veteran files for benefits
within one year of the date of the veteran’s discharge, 38 U.S.C.
§ 5110(b)(1) provides that the effective date is the day following the
300
date of discharge.
301
In Butler v. Shinseki, the court rejected a veteran’s argument that,
even though he filed his claim more than one year after discharge,
the effective date should be the day after discharge under §
302
5110(b)(1).
In reaching this conclusion, the court, in an
alternative holding that spurred another separate opinion from

294. See id. at 807 (citing the interpretive canon of ejusdem generis).
295. Id.
296. See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text.
297. See 38 U.S.C. § 5110(a) (2006) (“Unless specifically provided otherwise in this
chapter, the effective date of an award . . . shall be fixed in accordance with the facts
found, but shall not be earlier than the date of receipt of application therefor.”).
298. 38 C.F.R. § 3.400 (2010).
299. 38 U.S.C. § 5110(a).
300. Id. § 5110(b)(1).
301. 603 F.3d 922 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
302. Id. at 926.
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Judge Newman, ruled that the one-year period of § 5110(b)(1) is not
303
subject to equitable tolling.
In 1992, Navy veteran Steven Butler filed a claim for a “foot
304
condition,” specifically, a callus on his right foot. The VA granted
service connection effective July 22, 1992, the date Butler filed his
305
claim. Butler appealed to the Board, seeking to have the effective
date changed under § 5110(b)(1) to the day after his discharge in
306
November 1990.
Butler claimed that he had attempted to file his
claim within one year of his discharge, but had been told by VA
personnel that he could not do so because his discharge was not
307
honorable.
Butler had thus waited to file his claim until he
308
In a 1998
successfully challenged the nature of his discharge.
ruling, the Board denied Butler’s request for an earlier effective
309
date.
Three years later, on February 26, 2001, Butler filed a claim for
310
service connection for hallux valgus of both feet. On December 23,
2003, a VA physician diagnosed Butler with hallux valgus of both feet
311
and observed callus formation on Butler’s left foot.
Accordingly,
the VA awarded service connection for hallux valgus, effective
February 26, 2001 (the date Butler filed his claim) and for calluses of
the left foot, effective December 23, 2003 (the date of the VA
312
examination).
Butler appealed to the Board, claiming that “the effective date for
all of his foot conditions should be the day after his discharge, and in
any event no later than July 22, 1992, the date of the actual filing of
313
his original claim.”
The Board affirmed the effective dates set by
303. See id. at 926–28 (Newman, J., concurring) (arguing that equitable tolling is
available under § 5110(b)(1) under certain circumstances).
304. Id. at 923 (majority opinion).
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id. 38 C.F.R. § 3.400(b)(2)(i), the regulation that implements 38 U.S.C.
§ 5110(b)(1), provides that, if the VA receives a claim within one year of “separation
from service,” the effective date will be that day following separation or the date the
claim arose, whichever is later. 38 C.F.R. § 3.400(b)(2)(i) (2010). The regulation
defines “separation from service” as “separation under conditions other than
dishonorable.” Id.
308. Butler, 603 F.3d at 923.
309. Id. at 924.
310. Id. Hallux valgus is a condition in which the big toe deviates inward toward
the baby toe. See Foot and Ankle Conditions: Hallux Valgus (Bunion Deformity), THE
INSTITUTE
FOR
FOOT
&
ANKLE
RECONSTRUCTION
AT
MERCY,
http://www.mdmercy.com/footandankle/conditions/bigtoe/hallux_valgus.html
(last visited Feb. 22, 2011) (describing the condition and treatment options).
311. Butler, 603 F.3d at 924.
312. Id.
313. Id.
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the VA, noting that Butler had not raised the issue of hallux valgus
until he filed his claim on February 26, 2001, and that he had never
314
specifically claimed the left-foot calluses. As for Butler’s argument
that he had been misled into not filing his claim within one year of
discharge, the Board noted that the record did not reveal any
communication from Butler showing an intent to file his 1992 claim
315
earlier.
The Veterans Court affirmed, noting that, even if VA personnel
had misled Butler into delaying filing, the one-year deadline of §
316
5110(b)(1) could not be equitably tolled.
The court cited the
317
Federal Circuit’s decision in Andrews v. Principi, which held that the
one-year period was not tolled by VA’s unlawful failure to notify a
veteran, at the time of discharge, of the benefits to which he was
318
entitled.
In a per curiam opinion, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Veterans
319
Court’s decision in Butler. The court first determined that Butler’s
equitable tolling argument implicated the VA’s unreviewable fact320
finding. The court reasoned as follows: the only foot conditions at
issue in the Federal Circuit appeal were the 2001 and 2003 claims for
321
hallux valgus and left-foot calluses, respectively. The VA had found,
as a factual matter, that neither of these conditions were included in
322
the July 22, 1992 claim for “foot condition.” So, even if the July 22,
1992 claim “were treated as if it had been filed within one year of
[Butler’s] discharge, . . . this would not change the effective dates for
323
any of the foot conditions at issue [on] appeal.”
Thus, to grant
Butler relief would require overturning the VA’s factual
determination that the claims on appeal were not included in the
324
1992 claim, an action the Federal Circuit is powerless to take.
The court also noted an alternative ground for its holding, stating
that the ruling of the Veterans Court was supported by the Federal

314. Id.
315. Id. at 924–25.
316. Id. at 925.
317. 351 F.3d 1134 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
318. Id. at 1136.
319. Butler, 603 F.3d at 923.
320. Id. at 926.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id.; see 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2) (2006) (providing that the Federal Circuit may
not review factual determinations).
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Circuit’s holding in Andrews “that equitable tolling is not available
325
under 38 U.S.C. § 5110(b)(1).”
In a concurring opinion, Judge Newman disagreed with this
alternative holding. She noted that Andrews involved the VA’s failure
to notify a veteran of available benefits, whereas Butler involved
326
affirmative, erroneous advice allegedly given to the veteran. Judge
Newman argued that “[t]he giving of actual misinformation in
response to specific inquiry has been held to warrant equitable
327
tolling, depending on the circumstances.”
Judge Newman also
pointed out that the one-year period in § 5110(b)(1) is not a
328
“jurisdictional” time limit for which equitable tolling is forbidden.
She emphasized that the statute does not limit the time within which
a veteran can bring a claim for service connection; it affects only the
329
effective date if the VA finds service connection.
Therefore, §
5110(b)(1) is, in Judge Newman’s view, a “nonjurisdictional claimprocessing rule” that may be tolled when affirmative misinformation
330
is given to a veteran.
331
Butler, like the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Henderson,
implicates a broader discussion about the equitable leeway that
should be afforded persons pursuing redress in court or before an
administrative agency. Based on the text of the statute, and under
the reasoning employed by the Court in Henderson, it seems that
Judge Newman has the better view of whether the one-year deadline
of § 5110(b)(1) is subject to equitable tolling. As she correctly noted,
the statute does not withdraw all power from the VA to award benefits
332
if the claim is not filed within one year of discharge.
It simply
mandates that the effective date be later than it would have been if
the veteran had filed the claim earlier. Because the statute does not
limit the VA’s authority to hear a claim, the one-year deadline seems
to be non-jurisdictional.
Before the Supreme Court decided Henderson, there might have
been an argument that, under Bowles v. Russell, the time limit in §
5110(b)(1) is jurisdictional simply because it is found in a federal

325. Butler, 603 F.3d at 926 (citing Andrews v. Principi, 351 F.3d 1134 (Fed. Cir.
2003)).
326. Id. at 926 (Newman, J., concurring).
327. Id. at 927 (citing Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990)).
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. See supra Part II.B (discussing Henderson).
332. Butler, 603 F.3d at 927 (Newman, J., concurring).
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333

statute.
But, in Henderson, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected
the argument that all statutory filing deadlines are jurisdictional,
emphasizing that the deadline in Bowles was for an appeal from one
court to another—a situation where filing deadlines had long been
334
recognized as jurisdictional. Section 5110(b)(1), unlike the statute
in Bowles, does not provide a court-to-court appeal deadline. And, as
noted, it does not appear on its face to limit the VA’s authority. It
thus seems to be a claims-processing rule that is subject to tolling, just
as Judge Newman argued. In all events, this is a question that, as
Judge Newman noted, warranted further analysis than the court’s
opinion gave it.
2.

Awards of increased compensation
As a general rule, if the VA increases a veteran’s disability
compensation, the increased award is effective the date the veteran
335
applied for increased benefits.
Under 38 U.S.C. § 5110(b)(2),
however, an increased compensation award is effective on the date
the increased disability became ascertainable, if the veteran applied
336
for an increase in benefits within one year of that date. In Gaston v.
337
Shinseki, the Federal Circuit made clear that the application for
increased benefits must be filed within one year of the increase in
338
disability for a veteran to be eligible for the earlier effective date.
Chester Gaston had been receiving benefits for PTSD and other
disabilities for nearly a decade when, in March 1999, he filed a claim
339
for total disability based on individual unemployability and an
340
Social Security records showed that
increased rating for PTSD.
Gaston’s condition had worsened in 1994, but the VA granted Gaston
increased ratings with an effective date of March 1999—the date on

333. Accord Henderson v. Shinseki, 589 F.3d 1201, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc)
(citing Bowles v. Russell, 511 U.S. 205, 211 (2007)) (“The time limit [for appealing
to the Veterans Court] is set out statutorily, a crucial point for the Supreme Court in
determining which of such limits are jurisdictional and which are not.”), rev’d, 131 S.
Ct. 1197 (2011); see Bowles, 551 U.S. at 210 (noting “the jurisdictional significance of
the fact that a time limitation is set forth in a statute”).
334. Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1202–03.
335. 38 U.S.C. § 5110(a) (2006).
336. Id. § 5110(b)(2).
337. 605 F.3d 979 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
338. Id. at 984.
339. See supra notes 24–27 and accompanying text (discussing the criteria for
establishing a claim of total disability based on individual unemployability).
340. Gaston, 605 F.3d at 980.
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which he filed the claim for an increase.
Gaston appealed the
342
effective date, but the Federal Circuit affirmed.
The court noted that § 5110(b)(2) is an exception to the general
rule that increases in rating are made effective on the date the
343
veteran files the claim.
Specifically, that section states: “The
effective date of an award of increased compensation shall be the
earliest date as of which it is ascertainable that an increase in
disability had occurred, if application is received within one year
344
from such date.”
Gaston argued that “the Veterans Court
misconstrued 38 U.S.C. § 5110(b)(2) by limiting it to cases in
which . . . an increase in . . . disability occurred during the one year
345
prior to the claim.”
Under Gaston’s proffered interpretation, “if
there is evidence that an increase occurred during or before the one
year prior to the veteran’s claim, the effective date for increased
compensation” could be as much as one year from the date the
346
veteran filed the claim. Gaston pointed out that his Social Security
347
records showed that his condition had worsened in 1994. Because
his disability had increased before he filed his claim, Gaston claimed
that he was entitled to an effective date of March 25, 1998—one year
348
from the date he filed his claim.
Gaston’s argument is untenable based on the language of the
statute, and the Federal Circuit rejected it for three main reasons.
First, the court pointed out that the statute specifies that the effective
date shall be the date an increase in disability occurred only if the VA
349
Second,
receives the application “within one year [of that] date.”
the Federal Circuit noted that eleven other subsections in § 5110
provide for earlier effective dates for claims filed within one year of
an event and that it was “equally difficult to read these other
provisions as allowing earlier effective dates for claims filed more
350
than one year after the specified event.” Finally, the court discussed
the legislative history of § 5110(b)(2) and noted that the purpose of
the section “was to provide veterans a one-year grace period for filing
351
a claim following an increase in a service-connected disability.”
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.

Id. at 980–81.
Id. at 980.
Id. at 982 (citing 38 U.S.C. § 5110(a) (2006)).
38 U.S.C. § 5110(b)(2).
Gaston, 605 F.3d at 982.
Id.
Id. at 981.
Id. at 981–82.
Id. at 983 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 5110(b)(2) (2006)).
Gaston, 605 F.3d at 983 & n.2.
Id.
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Accordingly, the court concluded:
“[T]he only reasonable
construction of 38 U.S.C. § 5110(b)(2) is that a veteran’s claim for
increased disability compensation must be filed within one year of an
increase in the disability, as shown by the evidence, in order to obtain
352
an effective date earlier than the date of the claim.”
3.

Reduction of benefits
While precedential Federal Circuit veterans cases frequently deal
with efforts by veterans to increase their disability benefits, sometimes
the VA reduces the benefits paid to a veteran. For example, until it
was amended in 2006, 38 U.S.C. § 5313 reduced the benefits of
veterans who were convicted of felonies and “incarcerated in a
353
354
Federal, State or local penal institution.”
In Wanless v. Shinseki,
the Federal Circuit held that, under this prior version of § 5313, a
veteran’s benefits may be reduced even if the veteran is incarcerated
355
in a privately operated prison.
William Wanless had been collecting disability compensation for
356
various injuries suffered during his service in the Army. In 1993, an
357
Oklahoma jury convicted him of first-degree murder, a felony. The
court sentenced Wanless to life in prison without parole, and the VA
358
reduced his monthly compensation under § 5313. In 1998, Wanless
was transferred to a prison owned and operated by Corrections
Corporation of America, a for-profit company that operates prisons
359
under contract with the Oklahoma Department of Corrections.
Wanless sought to have his benefits reinstated, arguing that he was no
360
longer “incarcerated in a Federal, State, or local penal institution.”
The Board and the Veterans Court rejected Wanless’s claim, and the
361
Federal Circuit affirmed.
The court offered four reasons for interpreting former § 5313 to
include privately operated prisons. First, the court pointed out that
the statute’s language “focuses on a veteran’s incarceration . . . in any
facility and does not distinguish between government-operated
362
prisons and privately operated prisons.” Second, the court looked
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.

Id. at 984.
38 U.S.C. § 5313(a) (2000).
618 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
Id. at 1334.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1334–35.
Id. at 1335; 38 U.S.C. § 5313(a) (2000).
Wanless, 618 F.3d at 1334.
Id. at 1337.
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to the legislative history of the statute, which, in the court’s view,
clearly expressed a purpose to correct the problem of providing taxfree benefits to criminals who are maintained in prison at the
363
expense of taxpayers. Third, the court relied on a 2006 “clarifying”
amendment to the statue, which broadened the category of facilities
covered by § 5313 to include “Federal, State, local, or other penal
364
institution[s] or correctional facilit[ies].”
Finally, the court deferred
365
under Skidmore v. Swift & Co. to an opinion of the VA’s General
Counsel, which had concluded that § 5313 should cover privately
366
operated prisons.
D. Procedural Matters
As the cases discussed in this Article have suggested, veterans cases
often have a tortured procedural history, working their way through
various administrative bodies and courts.
It is therefore not
surprising that some of the Federal Circuit’s most significant veterans
decisions in 2010 addressed matters of procedure. Of import in 2010
were rules permitting a veteran to challenge a previously final
benefits decision on the ground that it contained clear and
unmistakable error and rules providing that the VA can implicitly
decide pending claims that are not specifically mentioned in a VA
decision.
1.

Clear and unmistakable error
In stark contrast to the principles of res judicata that govern
litigation in court, a veteran may, at any time, seek revision of a final
decision by a VA regional office or by the Board. To have the
decision revised, the veteran must show that it contained “clear and
unmistakable error,” referred to as “CUE” in the jargon of veterans
367
law. For example, a veteran might challenge in a CUE proceeding
a prior RO ruling as to the effective date of the veteran’s award. This
CUE proceeding would begin before the RO. Once the RO decides
the CUE claim, the veteran could appeal to the Board. On this

363. Id. at 1337–38.
364. Id. at 1338 (emphasis altered); 38 U.S.C. § 5313(a) (2006).
365. 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (holding that an informal agency judgment is
entitled to judicial deference depending on “the thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking
power to control”).
366. Wanless, 618 F.3d at 1338.
367. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 5109A(a), 7111(a) (VA decisions and Board decisions,
respectively).
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appeal, the veteran may not challenge as containing CUE, say, an
earlier RO ruling as to the veteran’s disability rating. Rather, the
appeal will be limited to the effective-date CUE claim. To have the
disability rating reviewed for CUE, the veteran must file a new CUE
claim with the RO. This rule is similar to the waiver rule of appellate
procedure in civil and criminal litigation: a party may not raise an
argument on appeal that the party did not raise in the court or
368
agency below.
369
In Guillory v. Shinseki, the Federal Circuit confronted a complex
fact pattern that presented an issue of whether a veteran was
370
attempting to raise a new claim of CUE on appeal.
The court
determined that the veteran had preserved his CUE claim
throughout the protracted proceedings, and reversed a ruling by the
371
Veterans Court.
As noted, the VA rates disabilities on a scale of 0% to 100%, and
372
payments increase with increases in disability rating.
Extraordinarily disabled veterans who already have a 100% disability
rating may be eligible for an additional award of “special monthly
373
compensation,” often called “SMC” for short.
SMC awards vary
374
based on the severity of the veteran’s disability. Moreover, when a
veteran needs “regular aid and attendance,” the veteran may be
375
eligible for additional SMC.
The veteran in Guillory, John Guillory, served in the Army during
the Vietnam War, where he suffered multiple injuries from a gunshot
376
wound.
In 1967, the VA granted Guillory a 100% disability rating
377
for brain trauma and awarded SMC.
In 1992, the VA granted
service connection and a 100% disability rating for a seizure
378
disorder. This additional disability qualified Guillory for additional
SMC as well as for aid and attendance compensation, effective May
379
1991 (the date of the seizure diagnosis).

368. GREGORY A. CASTANIAS
AND PROCEDURE 47–49 (2008).
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.

& ROBERT H. KLONOFF, FEDERAL APPELLATE PRACTICE

603 F.3d 981 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
Id. at 984–85.
Id. at 987.
See 38 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1155; supra Part I.
Guillory, 603 F.3d at 983 (citing 38 U.S.C. § 1114(k)–(s)).
Id. (citing 38 U.S.C. § 1114(l)–(o)).
Id. (citing 38 U.S.C. § 1114(r)(1)).
Id. at 984.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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In 1997, Guillory requested review of his file for CUE, claiming that
he was entitled to aid and assistance from the time of his original
380
rating in 1967.
Among other things, Guillory alleged that the VA
erred (1) by failing to compensate him for lost use of his hips, thighs,
and buttocks and (2) by failing to recognize that he suffered from a
381
seizure disorder prior to 1991.
In a 2003 decision, the Board
382
rejected these arguments. The Veterans Court remanded, however,
noting that the Board did not discuss a medical record from 1975
383
that appeared to diagnose Guillory with a seizure disorder.
On remand, the Board concluded that “there was no evidence that
Guillory’s seizure disorder was severe enough to warrant a 100%
384
disability rating prior to 1991.”
The Veterans Court affirmed the
385
Board’s decision that no CUE occurred.
The Veterans Court also
noted that, because the remanded 2003 Board decision did not
discuss Guillory’s hips/thighs/buttocks claim, the Board did not err
386
by ignoring that claim on remand.
Moreover, because the Board
did not discuss that claim, the Veterans Court ruled that it did not
387
have jurisdiction to address it.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit dismissed Guillory’s argument that
388
the VA committed CUE with regard to the seizure disorder. These
determinations, the Federal Circuit concluded, were based on
389
unreviewable questions of fact.
The Federal Circuit, however, reversed the Veterans Court’s
390
jurisdictional determination.
The government had asserted that
Guillory’s hips/thighs/buttocks CUE claim was a new argument that
391
Guillory must bring through a new proceeding.
The court noted,
however, that Guillory had always made two separate arguments for
special monthly compensation, one that related to his seizure
392
disorder and another that related to his lower body.
Thus, the
court concluded, “this is not a case where the veteran raised for the

380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Id. at 985.
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. Id. at 986.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. Id. at 987.
391. Id. at 986–87 (citing Andre v. Principi, 301 F.3d 1354, 1357–58 (Fed. Cir.
2002)).
392. Id. at 987.
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first time on appeal a new claim of CUE, separate and distinct from
393
the claims that the Board addressed below.”
2.

Implicit denial rule
A claim for benefits remains pending until it is finally adjudicated
394
by the VA.
If the VA leaves a claim pending, the claim may be
395
addressed when the agency adjudicates a subsequent claim.
Because the earlier claim remained pending, the effective date for
any resulting award of benefits will be the effective date applicable to
396
the earlier claim.
Under the “implicit denial rule,” however, a
subsequent denial of a claim that is identical to a prior, unresolved
397
claim terminates the pending status of the prior, unresolved claim.
In two cases in 2010, the Federal Circuit clarified the application of
the implicit denial rule, holding that the adjudication of a formal
claim for benefits implicitly resolves a pending informal claim for
398
benefits and that even if a claim remains unresolved by the Board
on appeal (rather than before the RO), a subsequent appellate
399
decision by the Board can implicitly resolve that claim.
a.

Informal claims

While veterans may file a formal claim for benefits by submitting
400
the appropriate form to the VA, the agency considers many other
401
actions to be “informal” claims.
Under 38 C.F.R. § 3.155(a), for
example, any communication from a veteran that shows an intent to
402
In addition,
apply for benefits is considered an informal claim.
once the VA has allowed a formal claim for benefits, any medical
evidence that the VA receives, including an exam conducted at a VA
403
facility, is treated as an informal claim for increased benefits.
404
In Munro v. Shinseki, the veteran, Philip Munro, suffered from a
service-connected granuloma (inflammation) on his left lung and
405
non-service-connected obstructive pulmonary disease. After the VA

393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.

Id.
Adams v. Shinseki, 568 F.3d 956, 960 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Id.
Id.
Munro v. Shinseki, 616 F.3d 1293, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
Id. at 1297.
Jones v. Shinseki, 619 F.3d 1368, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
38 U.S.C. § 5101(a) (2006).
See 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.155, 3.157 (2010).
Id. § 3.155(a).
Id. § 3.157(b).
616 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
Id. at 1295.
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awarded him benefits for the granuloma, Munro underwent
406
pulmonary tests at a VA medical center in 1995 and 1997.
These
tests showed that Munro suffered from severe obstructive airways
disease, severe obstructive pulmonary disease, and was permanently
407
disabled. In September 1997, Munro formally sought an increased
disability rating, but the VA denied it because the diagnoses were
408
In 2003,
unrelated to Munro’s service-connected granuloma.
Munro filed another formal claim for total disability based on
individual unemployability (TDIU), which the VA granted effective
409
March 31, 2003, the date of his formal claim.
On appeal, Munro sought an earlier effective date, arguing that the
informal claims initiated by his 1995 and 1997 VA medical
examinations were still pending when the VA granted him TDIU in
410
2003.
Munro argued that the effective date of the TDIU claim
411
should be 1995, or 1997 at the latest.
The Federal Circuit rejected this argument under the implicit
denial rule. The court noted that “the implicit denial rule is, at
412
bottom, a notice provision.”
The standard is “whether [a VA
decision] provided sufficient information for a reasonable claimant
to know that he would not be awarded benefits for his asserted
413
disability.”
Thus, a VA decision need not expressly discuss a pending claim for
that claim to be deemed denied. In Munro’s case, the informal
claims and the formal claim were identical—for an increased rating
due to his lone service-connected disability, granuloma of the left
414
lung.
Accordingly, the decision denying Munro’s September 1997
415
formal claim also implicitly denied the pending informal claims.
Practical concerns largely justify this application of the implicit
denial rule. Veterans receiving medical benefits regularly visit VA
416
hospitals, creating scores of informal claims.
From an
administrative perspective, it would be burdensome and inefficient to
require the VA to explicitly discuss every single informal claim in its

406.
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1295–96.
Id.
Id. at 1299.
Id. (alteration in original).
Id.
Id.
See id. at 1300.
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417

decisions. Moreover, the consequence of the VA’s failure to discuss
any one informal claim would be an unwarranted windfall. The
veteran would be granted an effective date that is the date of the
unaddressed informal claim, even though the VA will have likely
denied a subsequent formal claim that relates to that same disability.
Munro, for example, had only one service-connected disability, the
418
left-lung granuloma. His 1995 and 1997 informal claims related to
419
that disability. In 1997, the VA explicitly rejected a formal claim for
420
Although the VA increased
an increased rating of that disability.
Munro’s disability rating in 2003, it would be an unwarranted windfall
to the veteran to make that increase retroactive to the date of the
informal claims in 1997 (or 1995), just because the 1997 VA
decision—which related to the same disability as the informal
claims—did not discuss Munro’s 1995 and 1997 visits to the VA
medical center.
b.

Unresolved appeals

While claims, both formal and informal, remain pending before
the RO until they are definitively adjudicated, claims also remain
pending on appeal until adjudicated by the Board. In another
notable decision this year, the Federal Circuit held, in Jones v.
421
Shinseki, that a claim that is pending in appellate status cannot be
resolved by a subsequent RO adjudication. Only a subsequent Board
422
decision can resolve the veteran’s claim.
In September 1973, Clabon Jones filed a claim for “nerves,” which
423
he claimed was a service-connected illness.
The RO denied the
424
Jones filed a notice of disagreement, but the RO never
claim.
425
issued a statement of the case, as it is required by statute to do.
426
Accordingly, Jones’s claim remained pending in “appellate” status.
In 1985, Jones requested that his claim be reopened and that he be
427
granted service connection for PTSD. The RO denied the request
and, on appeal, the Board denied service connection for a nervous

417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.
427.

See id.
Id. at 1299.
Id.
Id.
619 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
Id. at 1373.
Id. at 1369.
Id.
Id.; see 38 U.S.C. § 7105(a), (d)(1) (2006).
Munro, 619 F.3d at 1371.
Id. at 1370.
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428

condition, including PTSD.
In 1991, however, the VA granted
Jones service connection for PTSD with an effective date of May 1989,
429
the date Jones had filed another request to reopen.
Jones appealed the effective date, claiming that the denial of his
1973 claim was not final because the RO never provided a statement
430
of the case.
The Board rejected Jones’s appeal, stating that the
Board’s 1986 decision denying service connection for PTSD implicitly
431
resolved the 1973 claim. Both the Veterans Court and the Federal
432
Circuit affirmed.
The Federal Circuit agreed with Jones that, because the 1973 claim
remained pending on appeal, it could not be resolved by a
433
subsequent RO decision. It could only be resolved by a subsequent
434
Board decision.
The 1986 Board decision rejected a PTSD claim
that was, in the view of the Veterans Court, identical to the 1973
435
claim for “nerves.”
The Federal Circuit held that this factual
436
determination was outside the scope of its review.
The court thus applied the notice standard to determine whether
the implicit denial rule was satisfied:
The key question is whether sufficient notice has been provided so
that a veteran would know, or reasonably can be expected to
understand, that he will not be awarded benefits for the disability
asserted in his pending claim, and thus can decide for himself
437
whether to accept the decision or seek redress elsewhere.

In the court’s view, the fact that the Board had denied a claim
identical to the 1973 claim provided Jones with sufficient notice that
438
the 1973 claim for “nerves” had been denied.
E. Claims Arising from VA Medical Treatment
In addition to providing benefits for injuries related to military
service, the veterans statute provides benefits for injuries arising from
VA medical treatment. Specifically, 38 U.S.C. § 1151(a)(1)(A)
entitles a veteran (or the veteran’s dependents) to benefits if the
cause of the veteran’s disability or death was “carelessness,
428.
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.
438.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1371.
Id. at 1371, 1374.
Id. at 1373.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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negligence, lack of proper skill, error in judgment, or similar instance
439
of fault on the part of the [VA] in furnishing” medical treatment.
Congress enacted § 1151(a)(1)(A) in response to the Supreme
440
Court’s decision in Brown v. Gardner, which held that the prior
version of the statute did not require a claimant to show fault by the
441
VA.
The claim in Gardner arose out of errors that occurred during
442
surgery for a herniated disc at a VA hospital.
In Roberson v.
443
Shinseki, the widow of a veteran sought benefits under the same,
prior version of § 1151, claiming that the VA’s failure to diagnose her
444
husband’s cancer entitled her to benefits.
Before the VA, Mrs.
Roberson and the VA presented conflicting evidence about whether
the VA physicians should have discovered Mr. Roberson’s cancer
445
during his final visit to a VA facility.
(Physicians discovered the
cancer during Mr. Roberson’s subsequent treatment at a private
facility.) The Board rejected Mrs. Roberson’s evidence and the
Veterans Court affirmed, noting that Mrs. Roberson had not shown
that the VA “should have diagnosed” her husband’s cancer prior to
446
the actual diagnosis in the private facility.
On appeal, Mrs. Roberson argued that the Veterans Court’s
conclusion conflicted with Gardner because it introduced an element
of fault into the analysis: whether the physicians should have diagnosed
447
her husband’s cancer. The Federal Circuit rejected this argument
448
and affirmed the Veterans Court. The Federal Circuit pointed to a
key distinction between Gardner and the case at hand: Gardner
involved an act of commission, botched surgery, while Roberson
involved an act of omission, the failure to diagnose the veteran’s
449
cancer. In a case involving an act of commission, like Gardner, it is
possible for a claimant to meet the burden as to causation (by

439. 38 U.S.C. § 1151(a)(1)(A) (2006).
440. 513 U.S. 115 (1994).
441. Id. at 119; see supra Part II.A (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in
Gardner).
442. Gardner, 513 U.S. at 116.
443. 607 F.3d 809 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 79 U.S.L.W. 3141 (U.S. 2011).
444. Id. at 811.
445. See id. at 812 (comparing Mrs. Roberson’s evidence, a 1998 letter written by
Mr. Roberson’s doctor, to the government’s evidence, statements by VA physicians
asserting that “[i]t is impossible to say if [Mr. Roberson] could have been cured if the
disease had been detected earlier”).
446. Id. at 813.
447. Id. at 814.
448. Id. at 817.
449. Id. at 815.
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showing that VA treatment caused an injury), but not negligence (by
450
not showing that the VA physician failed to act with ordinary care).
By contrast, in an omission case like Roberson, the court suggested
that “the only way to show causation is to demonstrate that the VA
451
failed to diagnose when it should have.”
In other words, in a
failure-to-diagnose case, a fault standard (whether the VA should have
diagnosed the disease) is the only way to ensure the requirement of a
452
causal connection between the treatment and the injury is met. As
the Federal Circuit explained, “[w]ithout a showing that the VA
should have diagnosed a condition, the VA would be subject to
insuring for every possible condition that a veteran has, even if
453
unrelated to . . . VA treatment.”
Based solely on the plain language of the prior version of § 1151,
the Federal Circuit’s conclusion is at least debatable. The question
under the statute is simply whether the injury occurred “as the result
454
of” the VA’s failure to act. Even if the VA physicians maintained a
high level of care, injuries could still “result” from the physicians’
failure to take certain actions. For example, it might be customary in
the medical community to provide only an x-ray to investigate certain
symptoms. But a particular veteran might be suffering from an injury
detectable only by an MRI. If this injury becomes more severe, it
might be said that the increased severity is a “result” of the VA not
conducting the MRI to detect the injury, even if no physician of
ordinary skill and judgment would have ordered the MRI.
As the Federal Circuit noted, however, this reading of the statute
would make the VA the insurer of practically any injury that a veteran
developed while in VA care, even if a reasonable physician would not
455
have diagnosed the injury. Plainly, Congress did not intend for the
456
VA to be responsible for any injury a veteran might incur.
Yet, as
we have seen in other cases, the Federal Circuit would not have been
required to interpret around the language of the statute had
Congress drafted it more carefully. In any event, the issues raised in
Roberson should not arise under the new version of § 1151, which
457
explicitly requires the claimant to show that the VA was at fault.

450.
451.
452.
453.
454.
455.
456.
457.

Id.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 815–16.
38 U.S.C. § 1151 (Supp. V 1988).
Roberson, 607 F.3d at 815–16.
Id.
38 U.S.C. § 1151(a)(1)(A) (2006).
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Like many of the cases discussed in this part, Roberson is emblematic
of the difficult balance the Federal Circuit tries to strike in nearly
every veterans case—reconciling the rights of injured or disabled
veterans (or their survivors) with the reality of an overworked,
underfunded, bureaucratic agency. While, as discussed in the next
Part, veterans law is occasionally altered by congressional legislation
or regulations issued by the VA, the bulk of veterans law is made in
the case-by-case adjudication of individual benefits claims. The
Federal Circuit has, and will continue to have, an important role in
ensuring that the benefits system strikes a fair balance between
deserving veterans and the preservation of scarce VA resources.
IV. VETERANS LAW IN THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES
Although this Article has mainly focused on legal developments in
the judicial branch, the corpus of veterans law is a product of all
three branches of the federal government. This part provides a brief
overview of the year’s significant developments in the executive and
legislative branches.
A. Executive Branch
In 2010, the VA made three major regulatory changes. First, as
458
discussed above in connection with the Paralyzed Veterans case, the
VA—at the insistence of the Federal Circuit—expanded the list of
health problems that the VA will presume to be connected to inservice exposure to Agent Orange or other herbicides used during
459
the Vietnam War. Under the new regulation, the following diseases
will be presumed to be service connected for veterans who served in
Vietnam between January 1962 and May 1975: hairy-cell leukemia,
other chronic B-cell leukemias, Parkinson’s disease, and ischemic
460
heart disease. The VA has stated that it expects more than 150,000
new claims to be filed within twelve to eighteen months of adoption
461
of the new regulation. It also has planned to review approximately
90,000 previously denied claims by Vietnam veterans for possible
462
service connection under the new regulation.
Veterans who have
458. See supra Part III.B.2.
459. Diseases Associated with Exposure to Certain Herbicide Agents, 75 Fed. Reg.
53,202 (Aug. 31, 2010) (to be codified at 38 C.F.R. pt. 3).
460. Id. at 53,216; see also 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a)(6) (2010) (setting forth
presumption of service connection for certain diseases for certain Vietnam veterans).
461. VA Publishes Final Regulation to Aid Veterans Exposed to Agent Orange, U.S. DEP’T
OF VETERANS AFFAIRS (Aug. 30, 2010),
http://www.va.gov/opa/pressrel/pressrelease.cfm?id=1945.
462. Id.
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previously filed claims based on Agent Orange exposure could be
463
eligible for retroactive payments based on those claims. In the first
six weeks after the amended regulation became effective, the VA
reviewed more than 28,000 claims related to Agent Orange
464
exposure.
Second, the VA established new presumptions of service
connection for nine infectious diseases associated with service in
465
Southwest Asia (including Iraq) and Afghanistan.
Under the
amended regulation, the VA will presume diseases such as malaria,
the West Nile virus, and tuberculosis, among others, to be service
466
connected for veterans who served in the Persian Gulf at any time
467
after August 2, 1990 and in Afghanistan at any time after September
468
19, 2001.
Finally, in a move that attracted significant attention from the
popular media, the VA relaxed the requirements for certain veterans
469
seeking benefits for PTSD. Specifically, the amended regulation no
longer requires corroborating evidence that the in-service stressor
claimed by the veteran actually occurred if the claimed stressor is
related to fear of hostile military or terrorist activity, a VA physician
confirms that the stressor supports a diagnosis of PTSD, and the
470
stressor is consistent with the circumstances of the veteran’s service.
The amended regulation should relieve veterans from proving that a
specific traumatic event (such as a bombing or firefight) occurred, so
long as the veteran served in a war zone and in a role consistent with
471
the event that allegedly caused the condition.
B. Legislative Branch
Congress also made important changes to the law of veterans
benefits this year. First, the high-profile economic stimulus bill, the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, gave well over $1 billion to
463. Id.
464. VA Processes First Claims for New Agent Orange Presumptives, U.S. DEP’T OF
VETERANS AFFAIRS (Dec. 17, 2010),
http://www.va.gov/opa/pressrel/pressrelease.cfm?id=2022.
465. Presumptions of Service Connection for Persian Gulf Service, 75 Fed. Reg.
59,968,
59,971 (Sept. 29, 2010) (to be codified at 38 C.F.R. pt. 3).
466. Id.
467. 38 C.F.R. § 3.2(i) (2010).
468. Presumptions of Service Connection for Persian Gulf Service, 75 Fed. Reg. at
59,971.
469. See, e.g., James Dao, V.A. Is Easing Rules to Cover Stress Disorder, N.Y. TIMES, July
8, 2010, at A1 (discussing the new PTSD regulation).
470. Stressor Determinations for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 75 Fed. Reg.
39,843 (July 13, 2010) (to be codified at 38 C.F.R. pt. 3).
471. Dao, supra note 469, at A1.
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472

the VA.
The VA allocated much of this funding to improving
energy efficiency in VA facilities and also embarked on many projects
473
to improve VA medical facilities and cemeteries.
Congress also expanded veterans’ eligibility for reimbursement by
474
the VA for emergency medical treatment in a non-VA facility. The
House report accompanying this bill stated that, while the VA is
required to reimburse a veteran for emergency treatment in non-VA
475
facilities, the VA under then-current law was not paying for
emergency treatment in non-VA facilities if the veteran had third476
For
party insurance that paid any portion of the treatment costs.
example, if a veteran had an automobile insurance policy with
minimal health insurance coverage, the VA would not reimburse the
477
veteran for the remaining expenses of emergency care.
The new
law allows the VA to reimburse a veteran for treatment in a non-VA
facility, even if the veteran has insurance that would pay a portion of
478
the emergency care.
479
In addition, Congress passed the Veterans’ Benefits Act of 2010.
Among other things, the law extends and enhances the life insurance
480
available to veterans, increases the VA-provided burial and funeral
481
expenses for certain veterans,
and increases the benefits for
veterans with lost limbs, veterans with traumatic brain injuries, and
the surviving spouses of veterans with dependent children under age
482
eighteen.
Finally, Congress approved the annual cost-of-living adjustment for
483
But because the consumer price index did not
veterans benefits.
484
increase in 2010, benefits payments will not increase.
472. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123
Stat. 115, 199.
473. VA Tops $1B Mark in Recovery Act Distributions, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
(Oct. 15, 2010), http://www.va.gov/opa/pressrel/pressrelease.cfm?id=1982.
474. Act of Feb. 1, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-137, 123 Stat. 3495.
475. 38 U.S.C. § 1725 (2006).
476. H.R. REP. NO. 111-55, at 2 (2009).
477. Id. at 2–3.
478. Pub. L. No. 111-137, § 1, 123 Stat. at 3495.
479. Veterans’ Benefit Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-275, 124 Stat. 2864.
480. See id. §§ 402, 407, 124 Stat. at 2879–81 (including an extension of the
duration of group life insurance for totally disabled veterans and an opportunity for
certain veterans to increase the amount of life insurance).
481. Id. § 501, 124 Stat. at 2881.
482. Id. §§ 601–02, 124 Stat. at 2885–88.
483. Veterans’ Compensation Cost-of-Living Adjustment Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-247, § 2, 124 Stat. 2623, 2623; see also H.R. REP. NO. 111-452, at 2 (2010) (noting
that Congress has passed cost-of-living adjustments for veterans every year since
1976).
484. Under the Law No Social Security COLA for 2011, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., (Oct. 15,
2010), http://www.ssa.gov/pressoffice/pr/2011cola-pr.htm; see also Cost-of-Living
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CONCLUSION
It is a busy time in veterans benefits law, both in the usual fora—
the VA, the Veterans Court, the Federal Circuit, and Congress—and
in a not-so-usual forum—the Supreme Court of the United States.
Whether or not the Supreme Court will maintain its involvement in
veterans law is unclear. As suggested in this Article, however, a
modest docket of veterans cases in the near future is not out of the
question.
One thing that seems certain is that veterans’ demands on the
benefits system will continue to increase. Although President Obama
485
has declared an end to combat operations in Iraq and has stated a
plan for a limited withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan in
486
2011, the foundation for future stress on the benefits system has
already been laid. Nearly 6,000 soldiers have been killed and another
487
42,000 have been wounded in the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts.
Many of these soldiers, as well as their spouses and children, will call
upon the veterans benefits system for the rest of their lives. And,
when they are unable to obtain the benefits they seek, some of them
will turn to the courts. These cases will continue to present the
Federal Circuit, and perhaps the Supreme Court, with challenging
questions of veterans law for decades to come.

Adjustment Act § 2(c), 124 Stat. at 2623 (tying increase in veterans benefits to Social
Security cost-of-living adjustment).
485. See Helene Cooper & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Declares an End to Iraq
Combat Mission, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2010, at A1 (noting that 49,700 American troops
remain in Iraq and that the same number of troops will remain through at least
summer 2011).
486. Helene Cooper & David E. Sanger, U.S. Will Widen War on Militants Inside
Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2010, at A1.
487. DOD Casualty Reports, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF.,
http://www.defense.gov/news/casualty.pdf (last updated Mar. 3, 2011).
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ADDENDUM
488

As in other annual surveys of the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence,
I provide a statistical addendum summarizing the year’s decisions.
This addendum provides an empirical snapshot of the Federal
Circuit’s veterans opinions, both in 2010 and over the past decade.
While further data gathering and analysis is certainly possible, this
addendum provides a brief, objective overview of the Federal
Circuit’s approach to deciding veterans cases.
Table 1: Results of Precedential Veterans Opinions, January 1, 2010 to
December 31, 2010
Result
Affirmed

Number of Cases
11

Dismissed in part, reversed in part, and 1
remanded
Vacated and remanded

2

Total

14

To illustrate the extent of the Federal Circuit’s agreement (or
disagreement) with the decisions of the Veterans Court, Table 1
summarizes the decretal language of the Federal Circuit’s published
489
veterans opinions in 2010.
Most of the Federal Circuit’s
precedential veterans opinions (as well as its unpublished
490
decisions) uphold the Veterans Court’s determination, either by
affirming on the merits or dismissing for lack of jurisdiction. In 2010,
78.6% (11 of 14) of the Federal Circuit’s published veterans opinions
affirmed the Veterans Court’s determination. Although this is
obviously a small sample, this affirmance rate is appreciably higher
than the 62% affirmance rate for published opinions by regional
circuit courts of appeals reviewing district court or agency

488. See, e.g., Kenneth R. Adamo, Gregory A. Castanias, Mark N. Reiter &
Lawrence D. Rosenberg, Survey of the Federal Circuit’s Patent Law Decisions in 2000: Y2K
in Review, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1435, 1699–706 (2001) (2001 patent law survey);
Castanias et al., supra note 4, at 975–85 (2006 patent law survey); Castanias et al.,
supra note 127, at 1056 (2010 patent law survey).
489. Decretal language is the portion of the opinion (usually the final line) that
states the court’s formal order. Castanias et al., supra note 4, at 984 n.1565 (citing
Jon O. Newman, Decretal Language: Last Words of an Appellate Opinion, 70 BROOK. L.
REV. 727, 727 (2005)).
490. See supra note 129 (noting that most of the Federal Circuit’s 2010 nonprecedential veterans decisions dismissed cases for lack of jurisdiction).
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491

determinations.
Whether the Federal Circuit consistently affirms
the Veterans Court at a rate higher than the regional circuits affirm
the district courts and uphold the actions of administrative agencies
could be an interesting question for future research.
Table 2: Precedential Veterans Opinions by Judge, January 1, 2010 to
December 31, 2010

Judge

Number
Authored

Rader

0

Newman
Lourie

Number on
Panel

Number of
Separate
Opinions

Percentage
Authored

Number
Authored
Generating
Separate
Opinions

3

0.0%

0

0

0

5

0.0%

2

0

0

1

0.0%

0

0

Michel

0

0

—

0

0

Bryson

1

7

14.3%

0

0

Gajarsa

2

3

66.7%

0

0

Linn

0

1

0.0%

0

0

Dyk

4

6

66.7%

0

0

Prost

0

4

0.0%

0

0

Moore

1

4

25.0%

0

0

Friedman

2

2

100%

0

1

Archer

0

0

—

0

0

Mayer

1

3

33.3%

0

0

Plager

1

1

100%

0

0

Clevenger

0

1

0.0%

0

0

Schall

0

0

—

0

0

Per
Curiam

1

—

—

—

1

Visiting

1

1

100%

0

0

Total

14

42

—

2

2

491. ASHLYN K. KUERSTEN & DONALD R. SONGER, DECISIONS ON THE U.S. COURTS OF
APPEALS 40 (2001). Kuersten and Songer’s sample set covers the years 1925 through
1996. Id. at 58–61 tbl.2.9.
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Table 2 provides a snapshot of which judges wrote and participated
in the Federal Circuit’s precedential veterans decisions in 2010. The
first column (“number authored”) indicates the number of
precedential majority opinions in veterans cases drafted by each
492
judge. The second column (“number on panel”) indicates for how
many precedential veterans decisions each judge was on the panel.
The number in the second column includes decisions for which each
judge was the opinion author. Judge Plager, for example, was on the
panel for one precedential veterans decision in 2010, and he wrote
the opinion.
The third column (“percentage authored”) shows the percentage
of precedential veterans decisions that a judge participated in for
which the judge authored the majority disposition. The fourth
column (“number of separate opinions”) indicates the number of
separate opinions (concurrences or dissents) authored by each judge
in veterans cases. The final column (“number authored generating
separate opinions”) indicates which judges authored the majority
opinions that generated those separate opinions.
Because the Federal Circuit randomly assigns cases and judges to
493
panels, one would expect that each of the court’s active judges
would hear a roughly equal number of veterans cases and that each
judge would participate in and author a roughly equal number of
precedential decisions. Yet three of the court’s judges, Judges
Gajarsa, Dyk, and Friedman, wrote over half of the court’s published
veterans opinions in 2010.
Again, this sample of opinions is too small to support any definitive
conclusions. The data does, however, replicate trends that other
commentators have found in Federal Circuit patent cases. Data
collected in 2006, for example, showed that Judge Dyk was more
likely than most of his colleagues to participate in a precedential
decision, suggesting that he was particularly likely to request that the
494
panel publish its disposition. In addition, data from that same year
suggested that Judge Newman was the most likely of her colleagues to
492. Individual Federal Circuit judges drafted twelve of the fourteen precedential
veterans opinions in 2010. One opinion was issued per curiam, Butler v. Shinseki,
603 F.3d 922, 923 (Fed. Cir. 2010), and Judge David Folsom, Chief Judge of the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, wrote the panel’s opinion in Roberson
v. Shinseki, 607 F.3d 809, 810 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
493. FED. CIR. INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURE 3(1) (Nov. 14, 2008); see also FED.
CIR. R. 47.2(b) (providing that each judge should hear cases from a cross-section of
the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction).
494. Castanias et al., supra note 4, at 977. See generally FED. CIR. INTERNAL
OPERATING PROCEDURE 10(6) (outlining the procedure for a judge to request that the
panel issue a precedential opinion).
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495

draft a separate opinion in a patent case.
Likewise, in the court’s
2010 veterans decisions, Judge Newman was the only judge to issue a
496
separate opinion.
Although some scholars have empirically studied the behavior of
the Federal Circuit’s judges in addressing particular substantive
497
questions, I am not aware of any study that has examined the
behavior of individual judges across the court’s subject-matter
498
jurisdiction. This may also be a fruitful avenue for future research.
Such a project could reveal whether individual judges use consistent
499
analytical methods in all types of cases.

495. Castanias et al., supra note 4, at 977; see also Christopher A. Cotropia,
Determining Uniformity Within the Federal Circuit by Measuring Dissent and En Banc Review,
43 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 801, 820 (2010) (noting that, in 2008 and 2009, Judge
Newman filed the largest number of dissents among the judges on the court).
496. Judge Newman also dissented from the court’s first precedential veterans
opinion of 2011. Hargrove v. Shinseki, 629 F.3d 1377, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(Newman, J., dissenting).
497. See, e.g., Michael P. Allen, Significant Developments in Veterans Law (2004–2006)
and What They Reveal About the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims and the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 483, 491–94 (2007) (studying
the court’s veterans benefits decisions); John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, How
Federal Circuit Judges Vote in Patent Validity Cases, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 745, 745–46
(2000) (studying the court’s patent validity decisions); R. Polk Wagner & Lee
Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial
Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105 (2004) (studying the court’s claim construction
decisions).
498. Cf. Cotropia, supra note 495, at 815–17 (collecting data on Federal Circuit
dissent and en banc practice, some of which was not limited to patent cases).
499. Wagner and Petherbridge, for example, identified two judicial approaches to
patent claim construction: (1) the proceduralist approach, which uses a hierarchy of
sources to determine meaning, with the plain language of the claim being
paramount, and (2) the holistic approach, which looks to varied interpretive clues to
determine the claim’s meaning in the particular circumstances presented. Wagner &
Petherbridge, supra note 497, at 1133–34. It would be interesting to see if, in
veterans cases, judges who employ a proceduralist claim construction method prefer
clear rules, such as the presumption of harmless error rejected by the Supreme
Court in Sanders, and if judges who employ a holistic approach to claim construction
emphasize a standards-based approach to benefits claims, emphasizing that the VA
should take into account all the information before it, an approach used in this
year’s decisions on the duty to assist and service connection. See supra Part III.A–B
(examining the Federal Circuit’s 2010 duty-to-assist and service-connection
decisions).
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Figure 1: Precedential Opinions Reviewing the Court of Appeals for Veterans
Claims, 2000 to 2010

Figure 1 depicts the number of precedential veterans opinions
issued by the Federal Circuit each year since 2000. It makes clear that
the court issued an unusually low number of precedential veterans
opinions in 2010 after issuing a relatively high number of veterans
opinions in the three-year period from 2007 through 2009.
Figure 2: Precedential Veterans Opinions Compared to Total Number of
Decisions Reviewing the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, 2006 to 2010
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To put the decline of precedential opinions in context, Figure 2
compares, for the last five years, the number of precedential veterans
opinions to the total number of veterans cases decided by Federal
500
Circuit merits panels. Figure 2 shows that, not only did the number
of precedential veterans opinions decline in 2010, the total number
of veterans cases decided on the merits declined as well. Given that,
over the past ten years, the number of claims received by the VA
annually has increased 75% (from 579,000 in 2000 to 1,014,000 in
501
2009), one would not expect the number of Federal Circuit
veterans opinions to trend downward.
If a downward trend
continues, this, too, might be an interesting area for future
investigation, especially if it contrasts with an increased number of
Supreme Court veterans cases.

500. I obtained the number of adjudications from data compiled by the Federal
Circuit itself.
See Statistics, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT,
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/the-court/statistics.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2011)
(scroll down to “Caseload, By Category,” then click on the hyperlinks for “Table of
data to accompany pie charts”). The annual data collected by the Federal Circuit
corresponds to the court’s fiscal year (October 1 to September 30), while the data I
have collected on the number of precedential opinions (from Westlaw) corresponds
to the calendar year (January 1 to December 31). While this data does not match
precisely, it still gives a helpful picture of trends in the Federal Circuit’s veterans
docket.
501. White House Seeks $125 Billion for Veterans in 2011, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS
AFFAIRS, (Feb. 1, 2010), http://www.va.gov/opa/pressrel/pressrelease.cfm?id=1848.

